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1 
LITIGATING TIME IN AMERICA AT THE TURN OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Jenni Parrish∗ 
“We are born in haste, . . . we finish our education on the run; we 
marry on the wing; we make a fortune at a stroke, and lose it in the 
same manner. . . . Our body is a locomotive, going at the rate of 
twenty-five miles an hour; our soul, a high-pressure engine; our life a 
shooting star, and death overtakes us at last like a flash of lightening.” 
—Michel Chevalier (1839)1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A recent New York Times review of the popular television show 
“24” begins by calling it “one of the most interesting new shows to 
appear on television in a long time.”2  It goes on to criticize the acting as 
“terrible,” the writing as “uninspired,” and the directing “ranges from 
perverse to nonexistent.”3  Then comes the praise. 
What is marvelous is the camerawork, the editing and the moment-by-
moment sequencing of each episode.  The people responsible for these 
aspects of the show have taken the fact that real time equals television 
time and made it the basis for a new art form.  The heroes of this 
program are not Jack Bauer and David Palmer; they are the minute and 
the second.  Emblazoned on the screen at irregular intervals is a digital 
                                                                                                                                 
∗Professor of Law and Director of the Law Library, University of California Hastings College of the 
Law.  The author would like to thank Linda Weir, Vincent Moyer, Ruxana Meer, and Katie Wadell 
for their exhaustive research assistance and enthusiastic support for this project.  Further thanks go 
to Reuel Schiller, Ed Symons, Welsh White, and George Grossman, for their insightful comments 
on earlier drafts of this article.  All these people have given of their time, the most precious gift. 
 1. Carlene Stephens, “The Most Reliable Time’’: William Bond, the New England Railroads, 
and Time Awareness in 19th-Century America, 30 TECHNOLOGY & CULTURE 1, 23 (1989).  “In 
1839, Michel Chevalier preserved this telling self-evaluation of an unnamed American. . . .”  Id. 
 2. Wendy Lesser, The Thrills, and the Chill, of ‘24’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, § 2, at 27. 
 3. Id. at 37. 
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clock that marks off the passing seconds, and every time we see it, our 
anxiety ratchets up a notch. . . .  The people and situations in “24” may 
not reach out and grab us, but their clocks do, and as their lives tick 
away in seconds, so must ours.4 
Time5 may have become a television celebrity this season, but 
telling time is something taken for granted by most people alive in 2002.  
Telling time however, has not always been as easy, straightforward, and 
mechanical, as it is today.  By the late nineteenth century, there was 
already sufficient conflict over how to tell time to force Americans to 
litigate the subject.  The courts wrestled with this dilemma while 
legislatures reluctantly moved toward establishing a uniform method of 
telling time.  Congress did not act until 1918.6  Why did it take so long 
to legally establish standard time in the United States?  This article will 
describe just how incredibly complex time determination has been in 
human history.  Focusing on the United States, 1870-1920, two theories 
will be offered as to why American courts in at least sixteen cases were 
left to struggle with inconsistent methods of telling time and why 
Congress took so long to step into the fray and finally resolve the issue.7 
II.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In 1858, Curtis v. March8 was decided by Judge Frederick Pollock 
in the Court of Exchequer.9  The defendant had failed to appear in court 
at the Dorchester Assizes at 10:00 a.m. sharp and so the judge directed a 
verdict for the plaintiff.10  The defendant’s attorney then entered the 
                                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. 
 5. Throughout this article there are so many descriptive adjectives preceding the word 
“time” that it can become difficult to understand the exact reference.  In general, sun time = solar 
time = God’s time = true, real or apparent time.  Opposing this, man-made time = clock time = 
mean time.  However, this is not an exact lexicon and some inconsistent usages are inevitable and 
must be defined from context.  Local time (also sometimes called mean time) is the time of a 
particular geographical locality usually determined through mechanized means (as opposed to a 
sundial).  Standard time is the time for one of the earth’s 24 time zones; its creation and adoption is 
a major subject of this article.  Daylight saving time is an artificial determination of standard time 
created to maximize the enjoyment of sunlight at certain times of the year; its creation and adoption 
are a minor focus of this article. 
 6. An Act to Save Daylight and to Provide Standard Time for the United States, ch. 24, 40 
Stat. 450-51 (March 19, 1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).  Daylight saving 
time, a subject deserving of a separate article, was repealed a year later.  An Act for the Repeal of 
the Daylight-Saving Law, ch. 51, 41 Stat. 280 (August 20, 1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
261-264 (2002)). 
 7. See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text. 
 8. Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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court and demanded to have the cause tried.11  “At that time it wanted 
one minute and a half to 10 by the town clock.  The clock in court was 
regulated by Greenwich time, which was some minutes before the true 
time at Dorchester.”12  On appeal, Judge Pollock, writing for the court, 
decided in favor of the defendant and the cause was tried.13  The holding 
however is far less interesting than the court’s dicta.14 
The difference between Greenwich time and the real time at Carlisle is 
several minutes, and therefore if a town council might determine the 
time, they might make a man born on a different day from that on 
which he was really born.  Or suppose that by act of parliament a 
person was bound to go out of office on a particular day, the town 
council by altering the time might put him out of office to-day instead 
of to-morrow.  So if a person is entitled to a bonus from an insurance 
office in the event of his living to a certain period, that must be 
decided, not by the town council adopting Greenwich time, but by the 
mean time of the place.  Ten o’clock is 10 o’clock according to the 
time of the place, and the town council cannot say that it is not, but that 
it is 10 o’clock by Greenwich time.  Neither can the time be altered by 
a railway company whose railway passes through the place, nor by any 
person who regulates the clock in the town-hall.15 
As innocent or impractical as this statement may sound, especially 
to the twenty-first century ear, it reflects mid-nineteenth century England 
which still ruled an empire and was a place where a person could look 
up at the sun and ascertain the time without resort to any kind of 
technology.16  It is particularly worth noting the disapproval of the 
                                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  The American press would engage in similar musings on November 18, 1883, the 
“day of two noons,” when American railroads adopted standard time.  MICHAEL O’MALLEY,  
KEEPING WATCH: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN TIME 123-130 (1990). 
 16. In truth however, railroads exercised far more influence than the judge wished to 
recognize.   
[T]he greatest push toward standardizing time reckoning at a supralocal level came from 
the railroad world.  If there was to be a single timetable for an entire railway system, 
there was also a need for a single, uniform standard of time. . . .  And, indeed, it was the 
railroad timetable that was primarily responsible for making GMT the uniform standard 
of time throughout Britain. . . . With the growing use of railroad transportation, many 
cities soon followed the railroads’ example and by 1855, 98% of all public clocks in 
Britain were already set to G[reenwich] M[ean] T[ime]. 
Eviatar Zerubavel, The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective, 88 AM. J. SOC. 1, 7 
(1982), citing DEREK HOWSE, GREENWICH TIME AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE LONGITUDE 87-89, 
105-14 (1980).  Clark Blaise elaborates: “The first decade of standard time in Britain, the 1850s, 
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notion that the railroad should have an influence on the determination of 
the time of day, because in fact, ten years prior to this decision, in 1848, 
“most British railroads had set their clocks to Greenwich, in defiance of 
local time and tradition.”17  Critics had condemned this as “railway-time 
aggression.”18  This was “‘usurping the power of the Allmighty.’ The 
authority for time, be it Greenwich Observatory, the railroad, or God, 
informed the principles, moral, economic, or otherwise, that governed 
daily life.”19 
The British case of Curtis v. March was the progenitor of a line of 
court decisions in the United States debating the appropriate means of 
telling time.20  In the period from 1880 to 1920, as the Victorian era gave 
way to the modern era, complex technological forces21 transformed the 
United States, and indeed the world.22  As one significant part of this 
                                                                                                                                 
was Britain’s shining moment.”  CLARK BLAISE, TIME LORD: SIR SANDFORD FLEMING AND THE 
CREATION OF STANDARD TIME 19 (2000). 
 17. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 71. 
 18. Id.  The same criticism was leveled in the United States.  “To allow the railroads to fix the 
standard of time would be to allow them at pleasure to violate or defeat the law.”  Henderson v. 
Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734, 735 (Ga. 1889).  See discussion of this case in text accompanying note 170.  
See also the quotation from Tex. Tram & Lumber Co. v. Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071 (Tex. 1906) in 
text and accompanying note 169. 
 19. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 71, (quoting HOWSE, supra note 16, at 49-53) (footnote 
omitted). 
 20. Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858). 
 21. MARK M. SMITH, MASTERED BY THE CLOCK: TIME, SLAVERY, AND FREEDOM IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH 90 (1997). 
  While the railroad compacted American space and time, the telegraph and steamship 
were technological bedfellows in the quest for global compression. . . .  The telegraph 
especially was deemed to have tamed nature and, in the process, mastered time. . . .  It 
was actually independent of nature because it could function ‘‘at every hour of the day or 
night, irrespective of weather.’’. . . 
  The ascendancy of telegraph time had the considerable effect of wrenching 
Americans, southerners included, from local time into world time, telling them, as it 
were, that they were part of a larger world market where time differences both separated 
and united localities in a standard temporal universe.  This was especially true after the 
laying of the Atlantic telegraph cable in the late 1850s. . . . 
Id. at 90. 
 22. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND 
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 152 (1986).  “Technology 
was transforming social structure and cultural values, but the shape of the society and culture that 
would replace them remained shrouded in doubt.”  Id.  “From around 1880 to the outbreak of World 
War I a series of sweeping changes in technology and culture created distinctive new modes of 
thinking about experiencing time and space.”  STEPHEN KERN, THE CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE, 
1880-1918 1 (1983).  “[W]ho never wonders if the dangers of technological progress don’t 
outweigh the benefits?”  O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 308.  ‘‘‘What people mean by the word 
technology is the stuff that doesn’t really work yet.’’’  Technology is both the problem and its own 
solution.  No wonder it obsesses us.”  STEWART BRAND, THE CLOCK OF THE LONG NOW: TIME AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 16 (1999). 
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transformation, people began to tell time differently and to focus on time 
in a different way.  Previously, the position of the sun reflected on a 
sundial was sufficient to determine the time of day.  But turn-of-the-
century Americans were increasingly focused on, and dependent on, 
time, and so the usual approximation based on sun time was no longer 
sufficient.  Eventually clocks and watches became the convenient 
substitute, but they all told different times because each was set based on 
the sun time at the longitude for the location of the timepiece. 
In 1883, a standard time was established by the railroads in the 
United States,23 in conformity with a worldwide movement toward 
standard time, i.e., a uniform common time for an identified 
geographical area.24  Businesses generally adopted standard time and 
eventually so did governmental entities.25  But legislatures were slow to 
enact legislation formally setting standard time as every citizen’s 
standard.26  The United States Congress did not adopt a standard time 
                                                                                                                                 
 23. Ian R. Bartky and Elizabeth Harrison, Standard and Daylight-saving Time, 240 SCI. AM. 
46 (1979).  “On November 18, 1883, most of the railroads in the U.S. and Canada began to operate 
on Standard Railway Time, reducing the number of railroad times from at least 56 to four.”  Id.  
Chapter 3 of SMITH, supra note 21, is devoted to the interdependence of steamships, railways, the 
telegraph and the postal service and their combined emphasis on punctuality. 
 24. In 1884 representatives of twenty-five countries that convened at the Prime 
Meridian Conference in Washington proposed to establish Greenwich as the zero 
meridian, determined the exact length of the day, divided the earth into twenty-four time 
zones one hour apart, and fixed a precise beginning of the universal day.  But the world 
was slow to adopt the system, for all its obvious practicality. 
. . . . 
  The proponents of world time were few, and none of them . . . were well known 
beyond the narrow circle of fellow reformers.  Nevertheless the concept of public time 
was widely accepted as a proper marker of duration and succession.  There were no 
elaborate arguments on its behalf because there seemed to be no need. 
KERN, supra note 22, at 12, 15.  For a wonderful, behind-the-scenes account of the Prime Meridian 
Conference of 1884, see BLAISE, supra note 16, at 194 et seq. 
 25. Ian R. Bartky, The Adoption of Standard Time, 30 TECH. & CULTURE 25, 49-50 (1989).  
“By April 1884 Allen was reporting that seventy-eight of the hundred principal American cities had 
adopted the new time.”  Id. 
 26. Not all states actually passed legislation controlling the use of standard time; some did but 
incorporated the 1918 federal statute by reference.  Those that did legislatively adopt standard time 
include the following: ALA. CODE § 11 (1907), 1945 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 38, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
6807-2 (West 1995), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-109(1) (West 2000), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4888 
(1902), 1889 Fla. Laws ch. 3916, 1947 Haw. Sess. Laws 161, § 20.01, 1959 Ill. Laws § 1, 1929 Ind. 
Acts ch. 103, 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 140, §§ 1, 2, 1868 Kan. Sess. Laws ch 25, § 172, 1931 Me. Acts 
ch. 273, 1884 Md. Laws ch. 433, 1920 Mass. Acts. ch. 280, 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 5, 1905 Minn. 
Laws § 5514, 1974 Neb. Laws LB651, 1921 N.H. Laws ch. 15, 1884 N.J. Laws ch. CXIII, §§ 1, 2, 
1884 N.Y. Laws ch. 14, § 5, 1927 Ohio Laws § 5979, 1961 Or. Laws ch. 417, 1887 Pa. Laws 18, 
1946 R.I. Acts & Resolves ch. 1778, § 1, 1909 S.D. Laws ch. 46, § 1, 1949 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, § 
1, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 359, 1921 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 261, §§ 1, 2, VA. CODE ANN. § 1-
15 (Michie 1950), 1953 Wash. Laws ch. 2, § 1, 1923 Wis. Laws ch. 244, § 1, 1884 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
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until 1918 and then it was done in conjunction with daylight saving time 
and justified as a war emergency measure.27  Daylight saving time was 
repealed a year later,28 but the standard time system was retained.  And 
so, until 1918 the nation was faced with conflicting approaches for 
telling time. 
Numerous lawsuits in which time’s reckoning was an issue 
occurred in part because there was so little legislation spelling out the 
accepted way to tell time.29  The sixteen American appellate cases 
analyzed below cover state court decisions and one federal court 
decision involving parties in two states.30 They range from 1889-1924.  
Most are civil actions; a few are criminal cases.  In some, time 
determination is crucial to the outcome; in others it is a tangential 
matter. 
A review of the parties’ arguments suggests the relevance of not 
                                                                                                                                 
ch. 95, § 1.  Most interesting of all, Congress passed An Act to Establish a Standard of Time in the 
District of Columbia, ch. 12, 23 Stat. 4 (1884), 34 years prior to the passage of the national statute! 
 27. See 40 Stat. 450-451 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). 
 28. An Act for the Repeal of the Daylight-Saving Law, ch. 51, 41 Stat. 280 (August 20, 1919) 
(current version 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).  For a summary of the daylight saving enactments 
and repeals in the twentieth century, see CARLENE E. STEPHENS, INVENTING STANDARD TIME 
(1983). 
 29. Dan Thu Nguyen, The Spatialization of Metric Time: The Conquest of Land and Labour 
in Europe and the United States, 1 TIME & SOCIETY 29, 33 (1992), citing HOWSE, supra note 16, at  
121-126.  “[B]y 1884, 85% of all US towns over 10,000 inhabitants were living on railway time.  
Once again, as in England, legislation lagged behind practice: Congress did not pass an Act to 
legalize standard time all over the United States until 1918.”  Id.  “The growth in railroad and 
scientific circles of an interest in standard time met with no response in the legislative assemblies of 
the country.  The only real possibility of action seemed to be through the railroads, and here the 
body most interested was the General Time Convention.”  Robert E. Reigel, Standard Time in the 
United States, 33 AM. HIST. REV. 84, 86 (1927).  Sometimes the resistance to standard time seemed 
to be both official and personal as with the mayor of Bangor, Maine, who vetoed an ordinance 
calling for the adoption of standard time.  “He declares that neither railroad laws nor municipal 
regulation has power to change one of the immutable laws of God, that the hours of noon, sunrise 
and sunset should occur at different periods of the day, at different localities upon the earth’s 
surface.” RAILROAD GAZETTE (N.Y., Feb. 4, 1884). 
 30. The cases considered here include: Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858); 
Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889); Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890); 
Proctor Coal Co. v. Finley, 33 S.W. 188 (Ky. 1895); Parker v. State, 29 S.W. 480 (Tx. Crim. App. 
1895); State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293 (Minn. 1898); Jones v. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, Il., 81 
N.W. 188 (Iowa 1899); Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., 87 S.W. 1115 (Ky. L. 
Rptr. 1905); Orvik v. Casselman, 105 N.W. 1105 (N.D. 1905); Tex. Tram & Lumber Co. v. 
Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071 (Tex. 1906); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. David Moffat Co., 
154 F. 13 (2d Cir. 1907); Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 116 P. 442 (Utah 1911); Walker v. Terrell, 
189 S.W. 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Bank of Fruitvale v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 170 P. 
852 (Cal. App. 1917); Goodman v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland.  Same v. Ins. Co. of State of 
Pa., 118 N.E. 523 (N.Y. 1917); Briegel v. Day, 195 N.Y.S. 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922); Carroll v. 
City of Bayonne, 124 A. 613 (N.J. 1924).  Another time case not analyzed here was Meier v. 
Phoenix Ins. Co., (unreported case decided in the Supreme Court of Ohio, April 4, 1902). 
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only local conditions for each case but also a national struggle over 
coming to terms with this new way of telling time.  In a sense, the time 
story follows the contours of the Legal Process Theory.31  Initially, time 
was a private matter determined by each individual through reference to 
natural clues.  But as society grew and industrialization expanded, 
individuals became more and more interdependent and conflicts 
developed as to whose determination of time would rule group activity.32  
Inevitably reference to the group’s decision-makers, judges, grew.  
These judges struggled valiantly, trying to develop logical easy-to-
follow guidelines so that Everyman would be able to determine what 
time it was.33  Alas, this was easier said than done.  One of society’s 
most dominant members, the railroads, developed and adopted standard 
time for its particularly important societal activity, transportation.34  
Eventually, judges bowed to the necessity of ruling consistently with the 
railroads’ decisions.35  Meanwhile legislatures, ever loath to enter the 
private sphere, began to see that the determination of time could no 
longer remain a private matter.  Gradually a body of state law36 and, 
eventually, federal law was adopted to regulate one more aspect of life 
which had once been a private matter.37  True to the bureaucratic spirit 
of the post-World War I era, a federal administrative agency, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, was placed in charge of making 
standard time and daylight saving time work for all citizens.38 
                                                                                                                                 
 31. See generally, HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,  THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
 32. See id. at 1: “Here enters the most fundamental of the conditions of human society.  In the 
satisfaction of all their wants, people are continuously and inescapably dependent upon one 
another. . . .  It is most significantly true of the great range of wants which depend for their 
satisfaction upon the division of labor.”  Id. 
 33. Id.  This is an example of what Hart & Sacks call “the principle of institutional 
settlement”: 
To leave decisions of these questions [of society’s common concerns] to the play of raw 
force would defeat these purposes [i.e., to preserve society]. . . .  The principle of 
institutional settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived 
at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon 
the whole society unless and until they are duly changed. 
Id. at 4. 
 34. See infra text accompanying note 254 et seq. 
 35. As suggested in the discussion of the court cases, as time went on, judges did bow to the 
inevitability of standard time.  However, traces of resentment over “railway-time aggression” 
lingered.  See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
 36. See supra note 26, citing the state legislation on standard time. 
 37. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in 
part by 41 Stat. 280-81 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). 
 38. Id.  See also William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and Critical 
7
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From a more historical perspective, establishing a uniform means of 
telling time can be viewed as one of many social challenges faced in the 
Progressive era.  Early on, telling time had been a matter of private, 
individual autonomy.39  But the industrialized setting of the early 
twentieth century demanded social cohesion, conformity to group norms, 
leading to efficiency.40  Because the executive and legislative branches 
of government were not at their strongest in this period, by default the 
judicial branch worked at resolving the conflict among all the different 
time-telling techniques.41  By World War I, with the emergence of a 
more active legislative branch, i.e., Congress, a legislative resolution 
mandated one standard and uniform method for telling time.42 
The period of 1870-1920 was a major transition period for the 
western world, and especially the United States.  It was a time of 
                                                                                                                                 
Introduction, in The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, supra 
note 32, at lix-lxii, for a  discussion of the growth of the administrative state from 1912 to 38.  
“[J]udges are generalists. . .” Id. at lxi. Administrative agencies were better suited for 
decisionmaking in areas requiring expertise.  The growth of bureaucracy and administration was a 
larger societal theme during the first decade or so of the twentieth century.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 314-17. 
 39. Still the most common explanations most Americans gave to political, economic, 
and social questions at the end of the century were couched in terms of largely 
autonomous individuals: poverty and success were said to hinge on character; the 
economy was essentially a straight sum of individual calculations; governance was a 
matter of good men and official honesty.  Part of what occurred in the Progressive era 
was a concerted assault on all these assumptions, and, in some measure, an assault on the 
idea of individualism itself. . . . In its place, many of the progressives seized on a rhetoric 
of social cohesion. 
Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVIEWS IN AM. HIST. 113, 124 (1982). 
 40.  “Like the language of antimonopolism, the language of social bonds focused its users’ 
anger on the irresponsible, antisocial act; but it directed its users’ longings not to honesty but to a 
consciously contrived harmony.”  Id. at 125. 
 41. ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 16 (1994). 
At the national level, accommodating all of these competing interests was of such an 
order of complexity—simply bargaining over tariffs became more than Congress could 
handle by the early twentieth century—that major financial and industrial policies were 
by default set in the federal courts.  Indeed, at the beginning of this period, the power of 
the president and the administrative capacity of the executive branch were so deficient 
(and deliberately so, given the power of political parties) that even the generation and 
diffusion of social and economic statistics were often beyond its level of competence. 
Id. 
 42. That federal appellate courts regularly intervened in national regulation was less a 
testimony to their autonomous power than to the incapacity of Congress to agree on clear 
standards.  Only in the decade preceding our entry into World War I and in the 
bureaucratic legacy of that war can one discern “the creation of the American state” as 
permanent and quasi-autonomous institutions. 
Id. (citation omitted).  For yet another view of this period, see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, 
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982). 
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nervousness,43 a time of war, and a time when the pace of change was 
involuntarily quickening.  Whether the preoccupation with the exact 
time in these court cases was the absolutely necessary part of doing 
business in the now modern world, as asserted by the parties to the suits, 
or whether it was simply “buncombe” as one judge44 described it, i.e., 
just an excuse to avoid contractual obligations, these decisions, reached 
varying but arguably reconcilable results. 
To the twenty-first century mind, time is money45 and so there is 
huge concern regarding making the most of every waking moment.46  
Many people maximize their waking moments by sleeping as little as 
possible.47  The thought that one might not know down to the minute just 
                                                                                                                                 
 43. KERN, supra note 22, at 15: 
Punctuality and the recording of work time did not originate in this period, but never 
before had the temporal precision been as exact or as pervasive as in the age of 
electricity.  From the outset there were critics.  Some pathological effects were noted in 
that catalog of medical alarmism, George Beard’s American Nervousness.  He blamed 
the perfection of clocks and the invention of watches for causing nervousness wherein ‘a 
delay of a few moments might destroy the hopes of a lifetime.’  Every glance at the 
watch for these nervous types affects the pulse and puts a strain on the nerves.  There 
were many other alarmists who reacted adversely to the introduction of standard time, 
but the modern age embraced universal time and punctuality because these served its 
larger needs. 
Id.  The early twentieth century preoccupation with time and the nervousness, neurosis, anxiety, and 
freneticism it brought on could be the subject of a separate article.  A number of authors discuss 
this; see RONALD TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
165 (1979) (discussing GEORGE BEARD’S AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS (1881)); SMITH, supra note 21, 
at 65-66 (nineteenth century merchants developed nervous disorders at the prospect of losing time), 
and at 85 (indicating that freneticism and similar afflictions were the salient features of the post-
1830 South); O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 150 (discussing nervousness due to the emphasis on 
punctuality), and at 158 (noting that teachers’ “nervous force” is saved by having clock-bound bells 
to start/stop their classes); KERN, supra note 22, at 70 (citing a concern that reading many 
newspapers, answering the phone, and thinking simultaneously about all five continents would lead 
to “injury to the nerves.”)  Multi-tasking was injurious before the concept was even invented! 
 44. State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293 (Minn. 1898).  Judge Frank Ives, of Polk County, 
Minnesota, made this assertion at trial as quoted in State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293, 294 (Minn. 
1898): “I shall certainly deprive this defendant, and all others, of any such buncombe as this for a 
defense.”  Id.  Justice Mitchell of the Minnesota Supreme Court commented: “There may be a 
difference of opinion as to the good taste of this remark” but found it harmless. Id. The term 
“buncombe” was quite popular in discussing time, as described by O’Malley, supra note 15, at 268: 
“Most writers resented daylight saving as some sort of fakery, a sugar coating on the bitter pill of 
morning.  The Saturday Evening Post called it “a harmless piece of buncombe,” but asked 
sarcastically “why not ‘save summer’ by having June begin at the end of February?” 
 45. Actually, this concept goes back to the mid-18th century.  Benjamin Franklin, Poor 
Richard’s Almanac, Jan. 1751, reprinted in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, iv, 86-87 
(Leonard W. Labaree, et al., eds.) (1961).  Id. 
 46. See JAMES GLEICK, FASTER: THE ACCELERATION OF JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING 9 (1999) 
(describing the malady as “hurry sickness”). 
 47. See id. at 121-25 (unnumbered chapter: “1,440 Minutes a Day,” noting the average person 
sleeps only seven hours and eighteen minutes); DAVID LANDES, REVOLUTION IN TIME: CLOCKS 
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what time it is strikes the driven, sleep-deprived, early twenty-first 
century person as unthinkable.48  But ultimately time is an artificial 
construct that has gone through many iterations in human history.49  One 
cannot improve on St. Augustine’s statement of the dilemma: “What, 
then, is time?  If no one asks me, I know what it is.  If I wish to explain 
it to him who asks me, I do not know.”50 
The next section will analyze the court cases for what they tell 
about a society that gradually came to see some value in a standard time 
system but was reluctant to legislate one formally.51  Then it is worth 
                                                                                                                                 
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 91 (1983) (discussing the fact that Petrarch hated sleep 
because it reminded him of death); A. Roger Ekirch, Sleep We Have Lost: Pre-Industrial Slumber in 
the British Isles, 106 AM. HIST. REV. 343 (2001) (arguing that the good old days weren’t); Verlyn 
Klinkenborg, Awakening to Sleep, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 5, 1997, at 26 (discussing the 
growing problem of sleep disorders); Facing Up to the Realities of Sleep Deprivation,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 1998, at B13; Valerie Marchant, In the Deep of the Night, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 1, 1999, 
(unnumbered pages) (noting that those who depart from the basic time clock pay a physiological 
toll); Michael Castleman, Dead Tired, S. F. FOCUS, Oct. 1996, at 47 (noting that sleepiness has been 
a major cause of catastrophe); Sue Shellenbarger, It’s the dawn of time for the sleep-deprived, S. F. 
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE, Feb. 28, 1999, at CL31 (discussing that skimping on sleep can have 
serious consequences); Nancy Ann Jeffrey, New Status Symbol: Eight Hours of Sleep,” S. F. 
EXAMINER, Apr. 4, 1999, at C-14 (arguing that for many Americans a lack of sleep interferes with 
their jobs, family duties and daily activities); David Tarrant, Z-Z Street, S. F. EXAMINER, Jan. 16, 
2000, at J-1 (noting that a lack of sleep costs employers billions); Mary Williams Walsh, As 
Overtime Rises, Fatigue Becomes a Labor Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 1, 28 (recognizing 
the dangers of physical exhaustion).  And for those not yet fatigued who need to know more, check 
out http://www.sleepfoundation.org. 
 48. “The time-obsessed used to keep their watches accurate to within seconds; now they keep 
their computers accurate to within milliseconds.”  GLEICK, supra note 46, at 7.  However, things 
may be different in some places, for example, Indiana, “where a traditional agricultural economy 
and a stubborn independence streak have kept daylight saving time at bay for decades.”  Pam 
Belluck, Indiana, Split by Time, Struggles Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A1, A18. 
 49. “The history of American time shows that like other values we tend to take as eternal 
certainties, time is for the most part a plastic, changeable notion, a social creation.”  O’MALLEY, 
supra note 15, at 312. 
 50. ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, Book XI, xiv, 17 at 230 (Henry Chadwick trans., Oxford 
U. Press 1991) (397 A.D.)  Anyone who writes seriously about time, quotes St. Augustine (though 
too often without a footnote).  Another interesting rumination from St. Augustine on this theme is: 
“The present of things past is memory; the present of things present is sight; the present of things 
future is expectation.”  Id. Book XI, xx, 26 at 235, cited in Earl McKenzie, Time in European and 
African Philosophy: A Comparison, 19 CARIBBEAN Q. 77, 78 (1973).  Then again, St. Augustine did 
not have access to THE AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (2d ed., 1905), 28:210, for 
this definition of time: “[T]he system of those relations which any event has to any other, as past, 
present, or future, and also as ‘the measure of duration.’” 
 51. There does not seem to be one answer to the question as to why legislation on standard 
time was so slow in coming.  O’Malley has stated: “Standard time, by 1900, was de facto law in 
most urban places—unauthorized by statute but honored almost unthinkingly in practice.”  
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 192.  However, he has also stated: “Time, after all, remained a fairly 
hazy idea for most people, fraught with vaguely unsettling religious implications and perhaps better 
left alone.”  Id. at 99. 
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considering how this country arrived at the point where one had to go to 
court to decide what time it was.52  For this, the rather untidy history of 
the process by which each human marks his/her progress on the 
continuum from birth to death (the ultimate point of telling time)53 will 
be summarized.54  While it was not just an American phenomenon, 
particular emphasis will be given to the uniquely American historical 
setting for these cases.  Finally, the federal legislation of 191855 
establishing standard time nationwide will be considered.56  This event 
brought to formal conclusion the struggle of sun time versus clock time, 
but only for a moment, and it marked the commencement of the more 
sophisticated twentieth century struggle over daylight saving time. 
III.  THE COURT CASES 
The litigation challenging the use of standard time or solar time 
falls into several categories: four fire insurance cases where the insured 
property has been destroyed just before or just after the expiration date 
of the policy depending upon which interpretation of time was used,57 
and one case involving insurance against robbery at a bank where the 
robbery’s time of occurrence (mean or solar) determined coverage.  
There are three liquor license cases where the bar owner’s license was 
revoked because of a violation of the time limit for selling alcohol and 
the defense was that the authorities were enforcing a different time than 
the barkeep.  In three cases juries returned verdicts just before or just 
after midnight (depending on whether solar or standard time was used) 
on a Saturday night.  In two of the three cases, it was the last day of the 
court term, so that if it was deemed to be after midnight, they were both 
violating the Sabbath and turning in a verdict after the court’s term 
ended.  Three cases fit no particular category.  The last two cases, 
decided in 1922 and 1924, have to do with the use of daylight saving 
time versus standard time.  All these cases are American, and all but one 
were decided in state courts.  But the grandparent of all of them, and one 
                                                                                                                                 
 52. See infra notes 218-66 and accompanying text. 
 53. “American folklore linked clocks with mortality and the linear brevity of life.”  
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 33. 
 54. See infra notes 218-66 and accompanying text. 
 55. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in 
part by 41 Stat. 280-81 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). 
 56. See infra notes 326-52 and accompanying text. 
 57. Probably the most interesting aspect of these cases, and something never addressed, was 
the insured’s intention with regard to renewing the insurance policy or obtaining a new policy from 
a different insurer. 
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oft-cited, is the British case, Curtis v. March, decided in 1858.58 
Curtis v. March, deserves further serious attention, even if it was 
often dismissed by American jurists, for what it says in dicta regarding 
the way judges grappled with the dilemma of two time systems.59  
Whether American judges agreed with the decision or not, its 
commentary on how time was to be determined would echo across the 
Atlantic. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, even earlier than 1858, Americans 
were having their own difficulties telling time.  Michael O’Malley, in his 
book, Keeping Watch, relays the story of the election controversy in 
Pottsville, Pennsylvania, a mining town, in 1843.60  The polls were 
supposed to close at 7:00 p.m., but some people were seen voting as late 
as 8:20.61  A follow-up investigation revealed that the numerous sources 
of the time used in the town could result in differences of up to an hour, 
depending on whose timepiece was relied upon. 
Who owned the most reliable watch?  Whose clock told the correct 
time?  In Pottsville, with no agreed-upon standard, it was impossible to 
tell. 
These men objected to being victimized by an arbitrary standard of 
time-a time derived from clocks they couldn’t verify or control.  Since 
watches were still too expensive for most people, the sun offered an 
indisputable standard honored by tradition and religious authority, free 
from the owner’s influence.62 
Consistent with Curtis v. March, until the 1880s American cases 
tended to be decided in favor of solar time reckoning.  Thereafter, 
because of the influence of the railroads and the standard time zones 
they had adopted, standard time gradually became the legislatively 
established norm for governmental bodies.63  As a consequence, many 
court rulings began to apply standard time in other circumstances.  
However, as seen below, there were some variations from this theme.64 
                                                                                                                                 
 58. See Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858) and text accompanying note 8, 
supra, for a brief description of the case. 
 59. Id. 
 60. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 40-41. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 41. 
 63. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
 64. It is reasonable to assume that a vast number of American cases were filed, and even went 
to trial, where a major issue was which method of determining time would prevail.  The sixteen 
cases considered here are those appealed to higher courts. 
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In Jones v. German Insurance Company of Freeport, Illinois,65 the 
plaintiff had a fire insurance policy on his property that was in effect for 
one year, expiring at “twelve o’clock at noon” on 18 September 1896.66  
A fire broke out destroying the property at 11:45 a.m. sun or common 
time, which was 12:02 1/2 standard time.67  Was the property covered 
under the policy or had the policy expired?  Did common time or 
standard time rule?  The Court affirmed the ruling below that common 
or sun time ruled,68 discussing and quoting extensively from Henderson 
v. Reynolds69 and Searles v. Averhoff.70 “Time, when it concerns a legal 
duty, should be fixed with reference to a certain unvarying, uniform 
standard, and that standard in this state, is the meridian of the sun.”71  
But Jones, decided in 1899, was the only one of the four fire insurance 
cases favoring the use of solar time. 
Rochester German Insurance Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co.72 
involved a fire insurance policy with a term from 1 April 1901, noon, to 
1 April 1902, noon.73  A fire started in a Louisville, Kentucky factory 
building at about 11:45 a.m., standard time, on 1 April 1902.74  The 
alarm was turned in at the fire department of the city at 11:59 a.m., 
standard time.75  11:45 a.m. standard time was 12:02 1/2 solar time.76  
The building’s owners insisted that standard time was in common usage 
and was what they meant when they signed the contract.77  The 
insurance company insisted that solar time was meant.78  The court 
affirmed the judgment below in favor of plaintiffs, supporting the use of 
standard time, but ordered a new trial on a question of insurance 
liability.79  The court stated: “To know the time, and to act upon the 
                                                                                                                                 
 65. Jones v. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, Ill., 81 N.W. 188 (Iowa 1899). 
 66. Id. at 189. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 190. 
 69. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889). 
 70. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890). 
 71. Jones, 81 N.W. at 190. 
 72. Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co. 87 S.W. 1115 (Ky. 1905). 
 73. Id. at 1116. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1119.  “In the Rochester German Insurance Company Case the further question 
arises, when must the loss occur?”  Id.  In the court below, the answer was that if the destruction of 
the warehouse was inevitable by noon then the policy covers it.  Id.  The appellate court says there 
can be a big fire of several adjacent buildings in an area that can go on for days and it is unfair to 
say that because destruction of a particular building is ascertainable on Monday that it is covered by 
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means of such knowledge as if it were a practical certainty, is of the first 
importance in most of the transactions of daily life.”80 
The third fire insurance case was the 1907 federal court case of 
Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Company of New York v. David Moffat 
Company,81 in which a New York insurance company insured a tannery 
located in Virginia for one year, expiring at noon on 8 January 1902.82  
The fire started between 11:20 and 11:30 a.m. that day, although exactly 
when the destruction of the insured property occurred varies with 
whether solar time or standard time is used.83  The court ordered a new 
trial because of a number of questions, including the fact that they could 
not determine whether standard time or solar time was in common usage 
in Iron Gate, Virginia, the location of the insured property.84  “If the 
contract were one to be performed here [i.e., New York], the answer 
would be easy,” stated the court citing the 1892 New York state law 
adopting standard time for all legal and official proceedings in that 
state.85  “Business in this city [New York City] has conformed itself to 
this regulation so universally that this court will take judicial notice of 
existing conditions.”86  But regarding what was meant, standard or solar 
time, in Iron Gate, “we do not pass upon it now, because there will have 
to be a new trial, and the testimony then presented may not be precisely 
the same.”87 
The fourth fire insurance case was Goodman v. Caledonian 
Insurance Company of Scotland.88  The inventory in plaintiff’s clothing 
store located in Buffalo was insured by defendant for the term of 29 July 
1913 at noon, to 29 July 1914 at noon.89  The issue in this case as in the 
three preceding cases was whether the fire occurred before or after noon 
and whether solar time or standard time was to be used to determine 
noon.90  The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff based on sun time 
but the appeals court reversed and ordered a new trial stating that a 1909 
                                                                                                                                 
the policy expiring at noon on Monday even if the big fire does not actually reach it until Friday—
that goes too far.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 1117. 
 81. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. David Moffat Co., 154 F. 13 (2d Cir. 1907). 
 82. Id. at 14. 
 83. Id. at 14, 20. 
 84. Id. at 21-22. 
 85. Id. at 20. 
 86. Id. at 21. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Goodman v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland.  Same v. Ins. Co. of State of Pa. 118 N.E. 
523 (N.Y. 1917). 
 89. Id. at 523. 
 90. Id. 
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New York law made standard time applicable.91  While the jury had 
found that the policies were in force when the fire began, the judge may 
have erroneously instructed the jury with regard to sun/standard time.92  
Therefore a new trial was ordered in which it was to be made clear to the 
jury that standard time controlled.93 
Bank of Fruitvale v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York94 
involved an Oakland, California, bank that had taken out an insurance 
policy against inside or outside robbery.95  The hours covered under the 
policy were 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday to Friday, and up to 8:30 
p.m. on Saturdays.96  On Saturday evening, February 21, 1914, $2,300 
was stolen at 8:34 p.m. standard time, 8:25 p.m. mean time.97  Time was 
not the only contentious issue here.98  The policy required that a guard 
be present at all times, yet the guard had inexplicably walked away at 
8:15 p.m., mean time.99  Also, the bank-plaintiff had not read its policy 
carefully and thought the coverage extended to 9:00 p.m., its time of 
closing.100  The court held in favor of defendant insurance company on 
all issues.101  With regard to time, standard time was actually mentioned 
in the contract to determine the beginning and ending dates and times of 
the insurance policy and so it was only logical that it should control as to 
time of coverage.  “Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
enumerates ‘the measure of time’ as one of the facts of which courts take 
judicial notice; and since the year 1883 standard or railroad time has 
been uniformly recognized and adopted as the measure of time in this 
state.”102 
One interpretation of these five cases is that they conform to the 
“construction against drafter” rule of contract law where ambiguity 
exists.103  “It is a general rule of interpretation that an expression is to be 
interpreted most strongly against the party responsible for its 
drafting. . . .  The rule finds frequent application in cases dealing with 
insurance contracts or other contracts containing standardized (printed) 
                                                                                                                                 
 91. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW §§ 52, 53, (c. 27, 1909) cited in Goodman, 118 N.E. at 524. 
 92. Goodman, 118 N.E. at 524. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Bank of Fruitvale v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 170 P. 852 (1917). 
 95. Id. at 853. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 854. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id., citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1875 (1915). 
 103. JOHN E. MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 425, § 88G, (3d ed. 1990). 
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terms.”104  In the 1917 Fruitvale Bank case, there was considerably less 
room for arguing ambiguity of terms because standard time had 
specifically been mentioned elsewhere in the contract and standard time 
was in general use in California by that date. 
Another interpretation of these five cases is that the earliest, Jones, 
decided in 1899, is the only one in which solar time prevailed, 
principally because the use of standard time was not then so widespread.  
The other three cases, all occurring after the turn of the century (1905, 
1907, 1917) show an increasing acceptance of standard time, particularly 
in the two cases where New York state statutes are cited as either 
persuasive (the 1907 federal case) or dispositive (the 1917 New York 
state court case).  The increasing popular acceptance of standard time 
eventually led to passage of the national law in 1918.105  But these 
straightforward explanations for the resolution of casualty and theft 
insurance disputes do not work so well for the liquor license cases. 
In 1878, a Minnesota law was passed stating that establishments 
selling intoxicating liquors must close by 11 p.m.  In 1889, the statute 
was reenacted with amendments but retained the 11 p.m. closing time.  
According to the court in State v. Johnson,106 “[i]n 1883, the railroads of 
the United States and Canada adopted four kinds of standard time, viz. 
Eastern, Central, Mountain, and Pacific, each applicable to a region 
covering approximately 15 deg. of longitude; in each case the standard 
being actual sun time at the central degree of longitude of the region to 
which the particular standard time was applicable.”107  In 1898, the 
defendant was convicted of keeping his saloon open after 11:00.108  He 
claimed it was 6 minutes before 11:00 sun time when he closed.109  
Neither the trial court nor the state supreme court was persuaded.110  The 
trial judge stated: “I shall certainly deprive this defendant, and all others, 
of any such buncombe as this for a defense.”111  In response to the 
defendant’s claim that such a statement was prejudicial error, the 
supreme court stated: “There may be a difference of opinion as to the 
good taste of this remark . . . [b]ut we fail to see how the remark could 
have prejudiced the defendant, when made merely with reference to a 
                                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in 
part by 41 Stat. 280-81 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). 
 106. State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293 (Minn. 1898). 
 107. Id. at 294. 
 108. Id. at 293. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 294. 
 111. Id. 
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legal proposition, with which the jury had nothing to do.”112 
It is worth noting that while this 1898 Minnesota trial judge 
described the solar versus standard time conflict as “buncombe,” 
something trivial, inconsequential, the popular mindset in 1898 was far 
different.113  People really did want to know with certainty what time it 
was, and, notwithstanding a statute applicable to a specific business, the 
average late-nineteenth-century American viewed sun time as the 
general standard. 
No court took the matter of sun or standard time more seriously 
than the Utah Supreme Court in the 1911 case of Salt Lake City v. 
Robinson.114  The defendant was convicted of violating a Salt Lake City 
ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor on Sunday or between 12 
midnight and 6 a.m.115  Defendant had sold beer at 20 or 25 minutes 
after midnight standard time but just before midnight solar time in Salt 
Lake City.116  The court decided that the City Council had mountain 
standard time in mind when it passed the ordinance and so the court 
upheld the defendant’s conviction on what was a quasi-criminal 
ordinance.117  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Straup maintained that in 
the case of an ambiguity in an ordinance, the case should be construed in 
favor of the person charged with violating the ordinance.118  He also 
objected to the fact that the court did not give the jury an instruction 
regarding the determination of solar or standard time and which time 
system was to be used in determining the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.119  Among the court opinions considered, this is one of the 
longer ones with elaborate examination of precedents, and yet the facts 
seem simple and straightforward.120 
The opinion is notable for its length.  There may be reasons for this 
that are not readily apparent today.  In particular, the conflict between 
standard and solar time was reaching some kind of turning point by 
1911, and the Robinson court may not only have felt compelled to be 
very explicit in its reasoning but also may have hoped to establish 
guiding precedent, settling the matter for other state court brethren. 
                                                                                                                                 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 116 P. 442 (Utah 1911). 
 115. Id. at 443. 
 116. Id. at 444. 
 117. Id. at 443-44. 
 118. Id. at 447 (Straup, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 448. 
 120. The briefs, which examine the precedents and facts, are no longer available for Salt Lake 
City v. Robinson. 
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The third liquor license case is another long opinion, full of 
extensive quotations from testimony given in the trial court, as well as 
citations to, and discussion of, other solar versus standard time cases 
(though neither Johnson nor Robinson is mentioned).  Walker v. 
Terrell121 involved revocation of a liquor dealer’s license because he 
violated the law which required that liquor not be sold after 9:30 p.m. or 
before 6 a.m. and not at all on Sunday.122  Again the issue was whether 
solar or standard time controlled.123  The trial court held in favor of 
standard time and upheld defendant’s conviction.124  But the appeals 
court applied the use of solar time and remanded the case for a new trial, 
even though the time issue was not raised in appellant barkeep’s 
pleadings.125 
The first two liquor license cases may simply reflect the long 
established rule that “localities have unquestioned power to regulate the 
sale and distribution of liquor-not only for protection of morality, but 
also for health and safety purposes.”126  They also reflect the rule 
suggested earlier127 that the closer in time to the end of World War I and 
the adoption of standard time by the federal government,128 the more 
likely the case was to be decided in favor of standard time.  The third 
liquor license case, a 1916 Texas case, is the anomaly.129  Without the 
briefs, it is difficult to be certain why the appellate court decided in favor 
of solar time. 
The last cohesive group of cases is the three “jury verdict at 
midnight” cases.  The first was Henderson v. Reynolds,130 where the jury 
began to deliberate at 8:00 p.m. on Saturday night.131  Shortly before 
12:00 midnight the judge asked the sheriff to see if the jury was likely to 
agree on a verdict before midnight.132  The sheriff reported that they 
                                                                                                                                 
 121. Walker v. Terrell, 189 S. W. 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); briefs no longer available. 
 122. Id. at 76. 
 123. Id. at 80. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.: (“[R]egardless of whether the question was raised by the pleadings in the trial court, 
that court’s ruling upon it is subject to review in this court.”). 
 126. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 634 (2d ed. 
2001). 
 127. See supra text and accompanying note 105. 
 128. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in 
part by 41 Stat. 280 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). 
 129. Walker, 189 S.W.75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). 
 130. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889). 
 131. Id. at 734. 
 132. Id. 
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were not.133  The judge then informed the jury that because they had not 
reached a verdict they would have to stay overnight and throughout 
Sunday, could not discuss the case, and could eat only at their own 
expense.134  The jury was sent back to the jury room and a few minutes 
later announced that they had reached a verdict.135  A motion for new 
trial was made on numerous grounds.136  The eighth ground was 
essentially that starving the jury was not the appropriate way to ensure a 
speedy verdict.137  “The ninth and tenth grounds complain that the 
verdict was made and returned on Sunday.”138  Therefore the issue of 
solar or standard time came directly into play. 
On appeal, the court found that such captivity of the jurors was 
error and a new trial should have been granted.139  “It may have been 
that the very jurors who were holding out against the proposed verdict 
were unable to pay for their meals, and therefore agreed to the verdict, 
rather than go without food until the court should meet again, the next 
Monday morning.”140  The court also spent considerable time on the 
argument that the verdict was made and returned on Sunday.141  The 
judge ran the court on railroad time and so it was midnight when the 
verdict was announced, which was 12:20 a.m. solar time.142  While the 
Georgia Supreme Court did not agree with running the court on railroad 
(i.e., standard) time, it did think that common sense and respect for the 
Sabbath required this judge to accept the verdict even if it was past 
midnight rather than to delay until Monday morning.143 
The second jury verdict time case is Parker v. State144 where the 
defendant was found guilty of murder.145  The defendant claimed that the 
                                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 734-35. 
 142. Id. at 734. 
 143. Id. at 735. 
It was much better to receive this verdict upon Sunday morning than to keep 12 jurors, 
and the officers attending them, confined in a room throughout the Sabbath and for 
nearly 36 hours.  It was an act of charity and of necessity to receive this verdict, so that 
the jurors could return to their homes for rest and refreshment during the night, and, if 
they so desired, could attend public worship during the day. 
Id. 
 144. Parker v. State, 29 S.W. 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895). 
 145. Id. 
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jury verdict was null because it was rendered after the expiration of the 
court term at midnight on the Saturday of the last week of the term.146  
The defendant contended that standard time should govern; the court 
was run on solar time measured by the courthouse clock, by which time 
the verdict was rendered before midnight on Saturday, May 14, 1892.147  
However, witnesses testified that the courthouse clock had been set to a 
sundial several weeks before and had been losing time since.148  Their 
watches, set to standard time, showed that the verdict was handed down 
at 12:46 a.m. on Sunday, May 15, 1892.149  Said the court: 
We think that the testimony fairly shows that the verdict was received 
by the court from 12 to 16 minutes before 12 o’clock, and that the 
sentence was pronounced on defendant from 5 to 10 minutes before 12 
o’clock, on Saturday night, the 14th of May, 1892, by the courthouse 
clock.150 
The court further stated regarding the witnesses who testified as to 
what their own watches said: “They, too, fail to depreciate their watches 
as being otherwise than good timekeepers.”151  The court adopted true 
sun time as controlling here even though admitting that the issue had 
never before been determined in Texas.152  They cited Henderson v. 
Reynolds153 and Searles v. Averhoff154 with approval.155 
The third case is Texas Tram & Lumber Co. v. Hightower,156 a writ 
of mandamus action to compel the judge to enter the verdict found at 
trial.157  In 1901, the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company brought 
an action of trespass to try title against the Texas Tram & Lumber 
Company to recover a parcel of land in the city of Beaumont, Texas.158  
The jury retired to consider its verdict at 8:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 26, 
1906, the last day of the court’s term.159  “Before the court was 
adjourned by the presiding judge at 3 minutes past 12 by railroad time, 
                                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 480-81. 
 148. Id. at 481. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. at 734 (Ga. 1889). 
 154. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890). 
 155. Parker, 29 S.W. at 481. 
 156. Tex. Tram & Lumber Co. v. Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071 (Tex. 1906). 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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which was at least 15 minutes before 12 p.m. by sun time, the jury came 
into court and returned a verdict in favor of [Tram]. . . .”160  The 
Railroad immediately moved for a new trial stating that the verdict had 
come too late, relying on railroad or standard time.161  The trial judge, 
L.B. Hightower, agreed and “determined as a matter of law that the 
adjournment was controlled by the railroad time, and that the verdict 
came too late.”162  The Texas Supreme Court reversed, citing with 
approval Curtis v. March,163 Henderson v. Reynolds,164 Searles v. 
Averhoff,165 Parker v. State,166 and Rochester Insurance Co. v. Peaslee 
Gaulbert Co.167  The court reasoned: 
The railroad time for the section in which Texas is included is not the 
true time for the particular locality, but the St. Louis time; so that the 
proposition resolves itself into saying that because the people at 
Beaumont have adopted in the conduct of their affairs the St. Louis 
time, when the Legislature declared that the April term of the Sixtieth 
Judicial District should continue ‘until and including the last Saturday 
in May,’ the end of the day should be determined by the St. Louis time, 
and not by the true time, namely, ‘the mean solar time.’  It seems to us 
the proposition so stated carries with it its own refutation.168   
Once again, a court unequivocally stated that, while the railroad time 
may be fine for the railroad and for businesses in general, it would not 
control the court’s affairs. 
While each court’s stand on solar time versus standard time 
undoubtedly played its part in the determination of these three cases, an 
alternative explanation may simply be that judicial efficiency demanded 
that the verdicts of these juries be accepted whether they were 
technically delivered on time or not.  To hold these jurors for a day or 
more, especially on the Sabbath, would have been unreasonable in the 
circumstances and a waste of the court’s time and money. 
The next three cases have no single organizing principle.  Searles v. 
Averhoff169 was in some respects the American version of Curtis v. 
                                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1071-72. 
 163. Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858). 
 164. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889). 
 165. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890). 
 166. Parker v. State, 29 S.W. 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895). 
 167. Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., 87 S.W. 1115 (Ky. 1905). 
 168. Tex. Tram. & Lumber Co. v. Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071, 1072 (Tex. 1906). 
 169. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890). 
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March,170 and is often cited for its pro-solar time outcome.  The 
defendant was summoned to appear before a justice of the peace at 10 
a.m. to defend an action on a promissory note.171  The defendant did not 
appear.172  The justice of the peace waited one hour standard time and 
then rendered a default judgment against the defendant.173  Before 11 
a.m., common time, the defendant appeared and asked to present his 
defense but was refused.174  The defendant then took the case on error to 
the district court where the decision of the justice of the peace was 
reversed.175  The supreme court affirmed.176 
Standard time, however, in Franklin county, where this case was tried, 
is about half an hour faster than common time.  Whether standard time 
is generally in use in the courts of that place does not appear.  The 
presumption is that common time is that relied upon where there is 
nothing to show that a different mode of measuring time has been in 
general use.  Where, therefore, the return of a summons is to be made 
at an hour named, standard time, the summons should so state.  
Otherwise it will be presumed that common time was intended.177   
Given the early time frame (1890) of this case, its pro-solar time stance 
is not surprising. 
Proctor Coal Company v. Finley,178 was brought to enjoin 
defendants from interfering with plaintiffs in the management of a 
Kentucky coal company.179  A stockholder meeting was held in 
Louisville involving two factions of stockholders.180  The meeting was 
set for 4:00 p.m. but one faction insisted on starting it at 4:00 sun time 
which came 18 minutes before 4:00 standard time.181  Business in 
Louisville was generally conducted on standard time and so numerous 
local stockholders had not yet appeared.182  Consequently, after protest 
from the other Louisville faction, it was agreed to start the meeting and 
the vote at 4:00 standard time.183  Because of this accommodation, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 170. Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858). 
 171. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 873 (Neb. 1890). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Proctor Coal Co. v. Finley, 33 S.W. 188 (Ky. 1895). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 189. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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state supreme court found the time issue irrelevant, or at least 
unimportant to a determination of the case.184  Although time 
determination was ultimately not an issue, the court affirmed that 
standard time was the “proper time.”185 
In the 1905 North Dakota case of Orvik v. Casselman,186 the 
defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiffs in an action to quiet 
title.187  Plaintiffs bought land after the mortgage of the previous owner 
was foreclosed.188  Defendant attacked the sale because of insufficient 
publication of the foreclosure notice and because the sale was conducted 
28 minutes before the time stated in the notice.189  The sale was to be 
held at 2:00 p.m.190  Standard time was 28 minutes faster than sun time 
and defendant contended that sun time should govern.191  The Court held 
otherwise, stating that standard time has “been in universal usage in this 
state since territorial times.  The court takes judicial notice of that 
usage.”192  The court went further and distinguished Henderson,193 
Searles,194 and Jones,195 stating that they had no bearing on the case 
because standard time had not been adopted by usage in those states at 
the time of the decisions.196 
The final category of cases occurred after passage of the federal 
statute adopting standard time and daylight saving time.197  In the first of 
the two cases, Briegel v. Day,198 decided in New York in 1922, the 
question before the court concerned the service of a summons and 
complaint according to daylight saving time instead of standard time.199  
The court upheld use of daylight saving time, which was authorized 
under state statute and had become a part of standard time in New 
                                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at 191. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Orvik v. Casselman, 105 N.W. 1105 (N.D. 1905). 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1105-06. 
 193. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889). 
 194. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890). 
 195. Jones v. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, Il., 81 N.W. 188 (Iowa 1899). 
 196. Orvik, 105 N.W. at 1106. 
 197. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in 
part by 41 Stat. 280 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).  See also O’MALLEY, 
supra note 15, at 259 et seq. for a history of the passage of daylight saving time. 
 198. Briegel v. Day, 195 N.Y.S. 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922). 
 199. Id. at 296. 
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York.200 
In the second daylight saving time case, Carroll v. City of 
Bayonne,201 decided in New Jersey in 1924, a new board of 
commissioners was to take over at noon on May 15, 1923.202  The old 
board had made a number of last minute appointments to the police and 
fire departments which the new board decided to rescind.203  The new 
board started its meeting at 12:03 daylight saving time, 11:03 standard 
time.204  The issue was whether their action was timely.205  The court 
decided that their actions had no validity because standard time ruled 
and therefore the commissioners were not yet officially in office when 
they made the rescissions.206  The court did state that the rescission 
“might have been vitalized by re-enactment, but no such course was 
taken.”207  Judicial efficiency was posited as one interpretation for the 
verdict-at-midnight cases discussed earlier.208  Judicial inefficiency 
seems an equally plausible interpretation for this case. 
In a time when litigation was not yet as prevalent as it is today,209 
and certainly taking cases on appeal was not business as usual, what 
might prompt such litigation?  Often the outcomes depended upon the 
timing of each particular case, with the later cases favoring standard time 
as the country moved in that direction in a legislative and commercial 
way.  O’Malley has suggested that the states in which these cases were 
tried were “hotbeds of rural radicalism and Populist support.”210  The 
Populists “rejected the kind of linear, ‘industrial’ time implicit in the 
new standards.”211  “Populist writings insisted on nature as the source of 
time and natural imperatives as guides to using it.”212  It was not that the 
                                                                                                                                 
 200. Id. at 297. 
 201. Carroll v. City of Bayonne 124 A. 613 (N.J. 1924). 
 202. Id. at 614. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  The court held that they were bound by 4 N.J. Comp. St. 1910, at 4879, establishing 
standard time for all official functions in New Jersey.  Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See supra text and accompanying notes 130-68. 
 209. J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 12 (7th ed. 1998).  
“During the period from 1658 to 1896 American courts reported 500,000 decisions, and by 1990 
there were 4,000,000 reported decisions. . . . it is estimated that over 140,000 cases are now 
published annually.”  Id.  
 210. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 140.  Most of the post-1900 cases took place in the 
midwest, the stronghold of Progressivism, the reform movement that followed Populism.  See 
EISENACH, supra note 41, at 68. 
 211. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 140. 
 212. Id. at 141. 
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Populists objected to “machinery-or clocks, or industry, or the railroads-
as to the ideas and assumptions about time and progress that governed 
them.”213  In the 1880s, standard time represented something unnatural, 
and therefore wrong, to them, and they would have the same reaction to 
daylight saving time in the immediate post-World War I era.214 
In all of these cases, other factors and other issues of law weighed 
as heavily, and often more heavily, than the issue of time’s reckoning.  
What is remarkable to the modern mind is that time determination was 
an issue at all.  In a number of these cases, it is probably fair to suggest 
that the solar/standard time conflict was a last ditch effort to win the 
case, just “buncombe” as it was characterized in State v. Johnson.215 
How did mankind move from prehistoric time where one 
presumably determined time by looking at the sun to the early twentieth 
century where one looked to the Interstate Commerce Commission for 
guidance on the time zone in which he lived?  Again, it is important to 
state the two overarching themes: the legal and the historical. 
From a legal perspective, the Legal Process Theory was playing 
itself out.216  Time determination started as a private matter, became a 
group concern, ultimately required the intervention of society’s 
arbitrators, the courts, to settle disputes about whose time was the 
correct time, and finally was settled by the national legislative body, the 
Congress, who delegated the actual implementation of time zones to an 
administrative body, the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
From a historical perspective, the Progressive era in the United 
States was the perfect setting for the regularization of time.217  The 
modern, industrial era required that citizens know the time in order to 
get on with the rest of their increasingly busy lives.  Before World War 
I, courts had ascended to the dominant position among the three 
branches of federal government and echoing this, state courts had 
stepped up and tried to resolve time discrepancies among citizen-
litigants.  Finally, Congress took the reins and established standard time 
for all the United States. 
While the legal viewpoint and the historical backdrop of the turn-
of-the-twentieth-century era are critical to understanding what happened 
                                                                                                                                 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id.  See infra text and accompanying note 299 (discussing populism). 
 215. State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293, 294 (Minn. 1898). 
 216. See supra text and accompanying notes 31-38 for an explanation of the Legal Process 
Theory. 
 217. See supra text and accompanying notes 39-42 for a summary of the time determination 
quest and how it fit in to the American state building of the Progressive era. 
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with time determination in America, they do not go to the deeper 
historical, psychological, sociological and emotional roots that run 
barely submerged under all efforts at telling time.  To fully understand 
what this is all about, that story must be told. 
IV.  TIME AND HOW IT CAME TO BE218 
Early man’s preoccupation with sustaining his own life and not 
becoming dinner for the prehistoric animals and other humans who 
roamed the earth precluded serious consideration of matters related to 
time.219 As survival issues came under better control, man had the 
opportunity to ponder the sun during the day and the moon at night, as 
well as the change of seasons and its impact on the length of the day.  
When man began to engage in agricultural activities, these time-related 
aspects of nature took on new meaning and importance.  Not only did he 
begin to count the days of the growing and harvest seasons, he became 
concerned about counting the days of his own lifespan.  He was close to 
nature and nature is very much about time.220 
                                                                                                                                 
 218. This is an enormously complex topic spanning all human history.  For a surprisingly 
thorough, if necessarily shallow, overview of 580 years of time history, see Nigel Thrift, Owners’ 
Time and Own Time: The Making of a Capitalist Time Consciousness, 1300-1880, in LUND 
STUDIES IN GEOGRAPHY SERIES B HUMAN GEOGRAPHY NO. 48, 56 (1981). 
 219. Actually, there are competing ideas about this statement.  “Time and its measurement 
have been preoccupations of mankind since the most primitive civilization in all parts of the world, 
and as his needs and his knowledge increased, so did man’s awareness and concepts of time 
develop. . . .”  S.E. Bedini, Oriental Concepts of the Measure of Time, STUDY OF TIME II 451 
(1975).  Further discussion of the nature of primitive man’s time consciousness can be found in A.J. 
Gurevich, Time as a Problem of Cultural History, CULTURES AND TIME 229 (1976).  But many 
believe that knowing the time down to the minute is a much more recent preoccupation in the 
history of mankind.  Matteo Ricci, the Jesuit, introduced clocks to China upon his arrival in 1577 
but the Chinese showed no particular interest in adopting Western clock technology.  Why the lack 
of interest?  According to David Landes, “it was simply not important in China to know the time 
with any precision.  Calendar dates mattered, but neither life nor work had ever been organized on 
the basis of hours and minutes.” LANDES, supra note 47, at 44.  The history of the creation, 
improvement, mass availability, and adoption of timepieces is a fascinating study.  See generally 
LANDES, supra note 47; DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO 
SOLVED THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995). 
 220. Michael O’Malley, Time, Work, and Task Orientation: A Critique of American 
Historiography, 1:3 TIME & SOC’Y 341, 355 (1992).  “Nature narrates time in preindustrial 
societies.”  Id.  Time is perceived in very different ways in different cultures.  For example: 
African time sensibilities . . . tended to compound all time, past and future especially, 
into what Kenyan scholar John Mbiti calls “No-time.”  The net effect of this time 
orientation, argues Mbiti, is that the “linear concept of time in Western thought, with an 
indefinite past, present and infinite future, is practically foreign to African thinking.” 
SMITH, supra note 21, at 131.  See also, GLEICK, supra note 46, at 272 (including more discussion 
of Mbiti’s research on Africans’ sense of time).  There is a good deal of literature on time sense in 
other cultures, see, e.g., G.I. Jones, Time and Oral Tradition with Special Reference to Eastern 
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Greater sophistication about perceptions of time and its 
measurement followed.  One example, the creation of the week, suffices 
to show how such a seemingly simple time measurement device could 
be so complex.  In a book devoted to the history of the week,221 the 
author, Eviatar Zerubavel, states: 
The week is the only major rhythm of human activity that is totally 
oblivious to nature, resting on mathematical regularity alone.  Its 
invention was one of the first major attempts by humans to break away 
from being prisoners of nature and create an artificial world of their 
own, and therefore ought to be regarded as one of the greatest 
breakthroughs in the history of human civilization.222 
Zerubavel describes two modern attempts to replace the seven-day 
week with an alternative.  Both attempts failed because the common 
folk, imbued with religious traditions, would not cooperate.  The first 
attempt was the establishment in France of a ten-day week from 1792-
1805 as part of the change wrought by the French Revolution.  (The 
metric system was also established at this time.)  Eventually, Napoleon 
called a halt to the idea.  The second experiment took place in Russia 
with a five-day week from 1929-31 and a six-day week from 1931-40.  
These shorter weeks were supposed to allow for continuous work force 
production, but eventually the division between city workers and the 
resistant country people became too great and the government 
capitulated and returned to the seven-day week.223 
Although the modern person takes them for granted, the 
complexities of working with a seven-day week, a 365 1/4 day year, 
                                                                                                                                 
Nigeria, VI J. AFR. HIST. 153 (1965); T.C. McCaskie, Time and the Calendar in Nineteenth 
Century Asante: An Exploratory Essay, 7 HIST. IN AFR. 179 (1980); McKenzie, supra note 50; 
DOROTHY PENNINGTON, Time in African Culture, ch. 8 in AFRICAN CULTURE: THE RHYTHMS OF 
UNITY (M.K. Asante and K.W. Asante eds., 1985); Thomas C. Smith, Peasant Time and Factory 
Time in Japan, 111 PAST & PRESENT 165 (1986); Eric Pawson, Local Times and Standard Time in 
New Zealand, 18 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 278 (1992).  The major focus of the rest of this article is on 
the way time orientation developed in the West. 
 221. EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, THE SEVEN DAY CIRCLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE 
WEEK (1985). 
 222. Id. at 4. 
 223. Id.  These experiments are described in chapter 2.  Id.  Studies of Russia’s dealing with 
time provide a fascinating tangent to the time story.  See Daniel H. Kaiser & Peyton Engel, Time- 
and Age-Awareness in Early Modern Russia, 35 COMP. STUDIES SOC’Y & HIST. 824 (1993) 
(concerning time understanding in the early eighteenth century), John Löwenhardt, Over Time: 
Time and Politics in the USSR,” 28 SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 656 (1987) (discussing the Russian 
successful resistance to Soviet government’s imposition of Summer Saving Time in the 1980s); 
‘Statutory Time’ Abolished in USSR, 32 SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 190 (1991).  Who knew there was so 
much resistance to governmental authority in Soviet Russia? 
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months of odd durations, and the attempts to “correct” these problems, 
all have an amazingly complex history.224  There were a number of 
reform movements in Britain and America in the twentieth century 
supporting a perpetual calendar, but in the end all have failed because of 
the supposed violation of religious freedom.225  Under a perpetual 
calendar, the Sabbath and the Lord’s Day, traditionally Saturday and 
Sunday, would start “floating,” a sacrilegious idea to traditionally 
religious people who therefore balked.226  Thus the seven-day week 
remains one of the last “irrational” cornerstones of modern 
civilization.227 
In medieval Europe, the Catholic Church made good use of time in 
reinforcing its authority.228  Thus, church bells would ring to call the 
faithful to pray at specified times of the day and night.229  People in the 
countryside came to rely on the bell ringing as an indication of the 
                                                                                                                                 
 224. ZERUBAVEL, supra note 221, at ch. 4. 
 225. The perpetual calendar had a 364-day (52-week) year, thus necessitating “blank” days 
inserted to achieve the 365 1/4 day year.  Such blanks would interfere with the standard calculation 
of the Sabbath.  See ZERUBAVEL, supra note 221, at 69, 81. 
 226. Id. at 81. 
With one “blank” day (or two, in leap years) being excluded from the annual reckoning 
of weeks, the Sabbath, for example, would necessarily drift back one or two days every 
year, essentially becoming a “floating,” “migrating,” “nomad,” or “wanderer” that might 
fall on just any day of the week.  That, of course, would have been a preposterous idea 
for any traditionalist, for whom the Sabbath and the Lord’s Day had always been 
synonymous with Saturday and Sunday. 
Id. 
 227. ZERUBAVEL, supra note 221, at ch. 4. 
 228. O’Malley, supra note 220, at 346. 
Preindustrial Europe derived its sense of what time was from nature—from using natural 
signs, like the sun, moon and seasons as indications of time’s passage.  But its sense of 
how to use time came in large degree from the church, or from a blend of religion and 
folkloric custom.  In every European community, a church-established calendar of holy 
days gave careful prescriptions on how time should be arranged. 
Id. 
 229. See LANDES, supra note 47, at ch. 3 for a description of the time discipline imposed on 
monks by the Church.  The situation in England is described by E.P.Thompson: 
It is by no means clear how far the availability of precise clock time extended at the time 
of the industrial revolution.  From the fourteenth century onwards church clocks and 
public clocks were erected in the cities and large market towns. . . .  [T]he sundial 
remained in use (partly to set the clock) in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
  Charitable donations continued to be made in the seventeenth century . . . for the 
ringing of early morning bells and curfew bells. 
E.P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 38 PAST & PRESENT 56, 63 
(1967).  Mark M. Smith describes a similar situation in early America.  Church bells, which could 
be heard for long distances even in the noisy urban north, communicated religious, natural, and 
civic time.  SMITH, supra note 21, at 44.  “God’s time and the various civic functions it served, then, 
punched its way both aurally and visually into the minds and ears of all southerners.”  Id. 
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segment of the day.  The ringing of the church bells would cause work to 
start and stop in the fields.230 
Holy days and holidays often occurred around certain natural 
agricultural events.231  Time was God and God was time.232 
Protestant faiths carried these connections between nature, time 
management and control even further, particularly in England and 
America.233  Max Weber argued: “It [time] is infinitely valuable because 
every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God.  Thus inactive 
contemplation is also valueless, or even directly reprehensible if it is at 
the expense of one’s daily work.”234  At the dawn of the Industrial 
Revolution in America, each village, city, town, and farm kept its own 
local time based on sun time.  Natural time (shown by the sun) as 
opposed to mechanical time (shown by clocks) reflected the conflict 
between religious authority and secular authority235 and also between 
religion and science.236  These conflicts would continue into the 
twentieth century. 
In the pre-industrial era, time was irregular, something 
                                                                                                                                 
 230. O’Malley, supra note 220, at 347. 
In many cases, the same bells, calendars and schedules that governed monastic prayer 
regulated the laborer’s day. . . .  The Church calendar merged the abstract idea of “Time” 
with the “social time” of everyday affairs and seasonal tasks: religion, and not simply 
natural, seasonal cycles alone, gave time its bite in daily life. 
Id.  David Landes points out that the medieval peasant came to resent the controllers of the bells and 
many of them were motivated to learn to count by the bells of the clock.  LANDES, supra note 47, at 
74-82.  Knowing the time and how to tell time gave medieval man a sense of power whereas to 
modern man the luxury of ignoring time (as on vacation) gives a sense of power.  Id. 
 231. O’Malley, supra note 220, at 346. 
 232. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 19.  “Standard time served most of the functions of God; it set 
the standards of trade and commerce, of justice and mercy.”  Id.  “Time . . . is like a loan from God: 
men and women have an obligation to use it wisely, to ‘improve the time,’ as the Puritans put it.”  
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at ix. 
 233. “In the seventeenth century both New England clergymen and magistrates thought of time 
as a holy attribute and urged its productive use by appealing to Puritan theology.”  Paul B. Hensley, 
Time, Work, and Social Context in New England, 65 NEW ENG Q 531, 533 (1992).  “We are 
entering here, already in 1700, the familiar landscape of disciplined industrial capitalism, with the 
time-sheet, the time-keeper, the informers and the fines.”  Thompson, supra note 229, at 82.  
“Southern merchants, like northern and British Protestants and puritans, for reasons secular and 
sacred, loathed to lose time.” SMITH, supra note 21, at 42.  “The connection of time to nature, and 
thus to God, that almanacs reinforced points to an American obsession with time, its measurement, 
and its proper use.”  O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 16. 
 234. SMITH, supra note 21, at 41, citing MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE 
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, 158 (1905, 1970).  Smith does note numerous challenges to Weber’s thesis.  
Id. 
 235. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 8-9. 
 236. “Throughout the nineteenth century, religion and science proved themselves the oil and 
water of modern culture.”  KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22, at 24. 
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approximated by scrutinizing natural clues, but regularity became the 
hallmark as mechanized clocks took over.237  In an industrial society, 
and one dominated by the sense of Puritan time thrift,238 as well as the 
“ethos of self-control in the emerging middle class,”239 time became a 
commodity to be bought and sold.240 
But who in the newly industrialized American society of the early 
nineteenth century determined what time it was?241  This was an 
important question because employers and employees distrusted one 
another to be the sole arbiter of time.242  This was not just a problem in 
                                                                                                                                 
 237. “Where time had been an abundant resource that suffered squandering at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, it became a scarce one that required husbanding.”  Martin Bruegel, ‘Time 
that can be relied upon.’ The Evolution of Time Consciousness in the Mid-Hudson Valley, 1790-
1860, 28 J. SOC. HIST. 547, 548 (1995). 
 238. E.P. Thompson summed it up well: 
In all these ways—by the division of labour; the supervision of labour; fines; bells and 
clocks; money incentives; preachings and schoolings; the suppression of fairs and 
sports—new labour habits were formed, and a new time-discipline was imposed. . . . 
. . . . 
Throughout the nineteenth century the propaganda of time-thrift continued to be directed 
at the working people, the rhetoric becoming more debased, the apostrophes to eternity 
becoming more shop-soiled, the homilies more mean and banal.  In early Victorian tracts 
and reading-matter aimed at the masses one is choked by the quantity of the stuff. . . . 
[Re leisure:] This, clearly, was worse than Bingo: non-productivity, compounded by 
impertinence.  In mature capitalist society all time must be consumed, marketed, put to 
use; it is offensive for the labour force merely to “pass the time.” 
Thompson, supra note 229, at 90-91. 
 239. Bruegel, supra note 237, at 554. 
 240. Time as property goes back a long way.  As Landes points out, in China in the sixteenth 
century, time as private property was anathema because all property belonged to the Emperor.  
LANDES, supra note 47, at 52.  And if it belonged to the Emperor, why bother to measure it, keep 
track of it, etc.?  Id.  Smith notes: “But before merchants could reduce time to money, they had to 
break free from Christian imperatives stressing that all time belonged to God.”  SMITH, supra note 
21, at 63.  And, of course, in the antebellum South, “[t]ime, after all, was the master’s, as it had to 
be in a slave society.”  Id. at 7. 
 241. Time in its many disguises is part of the great debate over the just derivation of 
power.  Who “‘owns’” time?  That is, who holds the ultimate right to negotiate its value—the 
worker or the boss?  The tenant or the lord?  The merchant or the priest?  Elected officials or 
an inherited elite?  Why are some born slaves to time, and others released entirely from its 
constraints? 
BLAISE, supra note 16, at 22. 
 242. Labor disputes in the 1830s erupted over the conflict between using the employer’s bell to 
start and stop the workday or using the employees’ watches.  See Bruegel, supra note 237, at 557 
(discussing such a labor dispute in Catskill, New York); Hensley, supra note 233, at 531 (discussing 
a New Hampshire labor dispute).  In the south, Smith described the conflict thus: 
On some important points, then, industrial capitalists and antebellum slave owners 
sometimes agreed: both harbored, to varying degrees, a distrust and suspicion of 
workers, slave and free.  Neither laborer, so it seemed, would work diligently unless 
coerced to some extent, and a monopoly over time, who owned it, and who set its value 
helped ensure this control. 
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the urban industrial North.  Slaves, the predominant labor force in the 
antebellum American South, were not allowed to learn to tell time just as 
they were not allowed to learn to read and write.243  It would have been 
too dangerous to allow them so much control.  In the North, factory 
owners kept the clock although workers were often suspicious of the 
accuracy of the timekeeper.244  As the production of watches grew in 
post-Civil War America, employees became their own timekeepers.  
Clock discipline finally came into its own.245  “The way people used 
time was central to the way society judged them.  Deviation from the 
standards of public time, like deviation from established morality, 
marked the dissenter as a danger.”246 
Exactly how was time determined?  Solar time, or apparent time, 
could be determined by the sun’s position on a sundial.247  When an 
observer noted the sun reaching its highest point in the sky, it was noon.  
However at different times of the year the sun would pass at a higher or 
lower point in the sky.  “Astronomers call this annoying habit the sun’s 
declination.”248 
The situation became more problematic when clocks were 
created,249 because clocks could not follow these seeming irregularities 
of the sun’s movement and, therefore, gave an average, or mean time.250  
Obviously, great potential existed for conflict between God’s time and 
man-made time.  Essentially, God’s time is sun time.  It varies in 
                                                                                                                                 
SMITH, supra note 21, at 6. 
 243. SMITH, supra note 21, at 133-36 (discussing fear of insurrections if slaves could tell time).  
Inevitably some slaves learned to tell time, especially cooks who had to follow timed recipes.  Id. at 
144-45.  A slave woman in Natchez held a “midnight school” from 11:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. to teach 
other slaves to read and write.  Id.  She could do this only because she could tell time.  Id. 
 244. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 30.  “The watch itself . . . becomes the authority for time, 
and its owner derives power from ownership.”  ’Id. 
 245. Id. at 23.  “No substantial domestic watch industry appeared before the Civil War.”  Id.  
However, Smith argues that time orientation came to the antebellum South in the 1840s.  SMITH, 
supra note 21, at 68. 
 246. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 72.  For an extended discussion of the impact of factory 
time on nineteenth century American family life, see Allan Pred, Production, Family, and FreeTime 
Projects: A Time-Geographic Perspective on the Individual and Societal Change in Nineteenth-
Century U.S. Cities, 7 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 3 (1981). 
 247. Every method of telling time has had its critics.  Take the ancient Roman playwright, 
Titus Maccius Plautus.  “Plautus had cursed the most advanced time-slicing technology he knew, 
the sundial: ‘The gods confound the man who first found out how to distinguish hours!  Confound 
him, too, who in this place set up a sundial to cut and hack my days so wretchedly into small 
portions!’” GLEICK, supra note 46, at 44, quoting Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 3.3. 
 248. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 3. 
 249. For more about timepieces created throughout the history of the world, see LANDES, supra 
note 47. 
 250. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 3. 
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infinitely small increments around the longitude of the world.  Sun time 
in Chicago is different from sun time in a suburb ten miles west of 
Chicago.  A sundial in the suburb would show the difference when 
compared to a sundial in Chicago.  But small increments of sun time 
create difficulties in communication and coordination across geography.  
And so, man-made time was created. 
Standard time took things a step further, both in efficiency and in 
conflict.251  The earth was divided into 24 time zones, each 
approximately 1,000 miles at the equator or 15 degrees of longitude 
wide at all latitudes.252  The time for the entire zone was determined at a 
point midway in the zone.  This worked well for that middle area but 
became more annoying at the edges of the zone where standard time 
might vary from sun time by as much as 66 minutes.253 
Much of nineteenth century American history is dominated by the 
history of the railroads.254  This is particularly true with respect to 
American time history.  “Between 1840 and 1860 total American 
railroad mileage increased more than ten times, while average speeds 
doubled.”255  This was an exciting era, one in which Henry David 
                                                                                                                                 
 251. Standard time has been defined as time based upon a certain definite meridian that is 
adopted by law or usage as the time meridian for a more or less wide extent of country, 
in place of the various meridians upon which local mean time is based.  Its advantage is 
that neighboring communities or places keep exactly the same time, instead of differing 
by a few minutes or seconds according to their difference of longitude, a matter of 
especial importance in connection with the operation of railroads and telegraphs, or the 
transaction of any business wherein contracts involve any definite time limits. 
No. 10122. Standard Time Zone Investigation, 51 I.C.C. 273, 278 (1918).  “Of all the 
inventions of the Industrial Age, standard time has endured, virtually unchanged, the 
longest. . . .  Arguably, standard time has exercised the deepest influence on everything to 
come afterwards.”  BLAISE, supra note 16, at 12. 
 252. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 8. 
 253. Bartky, supra note 25, at 52-53. 
 254. “Railroads emboldened us. . . .  It is the perception of movement on all fronts, like 
skittering pond life, that defined the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century, and it is the railroad 
that lends itself as the single most conspicuous symbol of the Industrial Age.”  BLAISE, supra note 
16, at 138.  See also SMITH, supra note 21, ch. 3, and Zerubavel, supra note 16.  Analogies have 
been drawn between the transportation revolution of the nineteenth century and the Internet 
revolution of the twentieth century.  See, e.g., Jason Zweig, Baloney.com Don’t Believe the Hype 
About Internet Stocks and Funds, MONEY 63-66 (May 1999).  In fact, all the new technologies of 
the late nineteenth century eventually are compared to the Internet.  See also TOM STANDAGE, THE 
VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS (1998). 
 255. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 61.  See also, STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 9th unnumbered 
page: 
Railroad and telegraph lines spanned the continent with amazing speed.  Only 23 miles 
of track had been laid in the United States by 1830; by the end of the Civil War, the 
number had grown to 35,000 miles; and on the eve of the adoption of Standard Railway 
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Thoreau said that men talked and thought faster due to the electrifying 
effect of the railroad.256  When the railroad was a relatively small, 
localized operation, keeping schedule according to the local sun time of 
the towns the train travelled through was not overly problematic.  But as 
the railroad grew, the use of local times became increasingly complex.257  
People did not know when to expect trains to arrive or depart and there 
were safety issues involved with so many more trains using the same 
tracks.258  Finally, in 1883, all the American railroad companies agreed 
to run on standard time, with the continental United States divided into 
four time zones.259  In 1884, the Prime Meridian Conference was held in 
Washington, D.C., and a world delegation determined that standard time 
would be adopted.  The world would be divided into 24 time zones, and 
Greenwich would be the prime meridian.260  While the world had now 
adopted standard time, there was still considerable resistance to its 
enforcement in many locations including the United States.261 
At the turn of the century there were technological advances in 
transportation, communication, and every facet of the way people in the 
                                                                                                                                 
Time there were over 93,000 miles.  Telegraph lines—cheaper and easier to erect—
spread even quicker.  Between 1847, when the telegraph was commercially introduced, 
and 1860, 50,000 miles of wire went into operation; by 1880, 31,703,000 messages a 
year flashed over 291,000 miles of wire. 
Id. 
 256. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 68. 
 257. Id. at 73.  But see Bartky, supra note 25, at 34, who insists it was not the railroad but “the 
need for a uniform system in geophysics—for simultaneity of observations—that led to the adoption 
of standard time in the United States.” 
 258. Stephens, supra note 1, at 17-21; BLAISE, supra note 16, at 72.  But, Ian Bartky insists 
that no traveler was confused—all they had to do was ask.  Bartky, supra note 25, at 33. 
 259. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 140.  “Standard time advanced with all the weight and 
momentum of industrial progress, and its opponents were clearly out of step with prevailing opinion 
in most published sources.”  Id.  For a description of the day, Sunday, November 18, 1883, that 
standard time was adopted, see id. at chapter 3: “The Day of Two Noons.” 
[T]he railroad became the arbiter of time as of so much else in the nation and in the 
South. . . .  Yet there was no guarantee the trains could always adhere to their own 
standard. . . .  The train, everyone came to realize, lived according to a schedule that 
suited the system, the mechanism.  The locomotive passed through nearly a thousand 
Southern counties but it belonged to none of them. 
EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 12 (1992) 
(footnote omitted). 
 260. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 212.  “A great hinge had creaked shut and the world had been 
fundamentally altered.  Sundial time was banished, a sophisticated abstraction had taken its place.  
Not a penny was spent, not a drop of blood spilled.”  Id.  See id. at 194, for a description of the 
Prime Meridian Conference of 1884. 
 261. SMITH, supra note 21, at 92.  “Not all, however, relished the temporal control the railroads 
in particular, the agents of time consciousness generally, imposed on society.”  Id.  Such feelings 
went back to the days of Curtis v. March, this 1858 British case is considered in the text 
accompanying note 8. 
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western world lived and worked.262  The pace of change had 
quickened263 and it was measured by the ever-improving, increasingly 
available264 timepieces which facilitated an unprecedented time 
orientation.265  Awareness of time speeded up change and change 
motivated an addiction to the awareness of time.266  The 19th century 
perceived itself as moving faster than ever before, and not just on trains.  
An unrelenting haste began to permeate American life. 
So why would these sophisticated, modern individuals with their 
eyes on their watches and their ears tuned to the train’s whistle tolerate 
life in a society where some people still told time by the sun while others 
relied on watches and some jurisdictions relied on solar time while 
others ran by railroad (standard) time?  Because the urban sophisticates 
were just one of many groups living in America at the turn of the 
twentieth century and telling time was only one of many social issues 
with which this country was grappling. 
V.  THE DARKER SIDE: AMERICA, 1870-1914 
Always there was a darker side to the exciting and monumental 
changes wrought during this period.  “Americans in a basic sense no 
longer knew who or where they were.  The setting had altered beyond 
their power to understand it, and within an alien context they had lost 
themselves.”267  In the immediate post-Civil War period, America was a 
nation of small communities and small businesses where neighbors were 
                                                                                                                                 
 262. KERN, supra note 22, at 110.  “There was no question that the pace of life was greatly 
accelerated, but there was sharp debate about the meaning and value of speed.”  Id. 
 263. Id. at 88.  “The world was racing into the future like the Titanic into the North Atlantic, 
and those who looked ahead foresaw both shipwreck and the wonders of time travel.”  Id. 
 264. Id. at 111.  “The new profusion of watches was a response to, as well as a cause of, a 
heightened sense of punctuality in this period, especially in urban centers.”  Id.  O’Malley relates 
the story of the popularity of watches increasing after the Civil War as their prices went down and 
their availability from mail order businesses like Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward increased.  
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 183. 
 265. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 256.  “Modern life,” the pioneering sociologist Thorsten 
Veblen observed in 1916, “goes by clockwork.”  Id.  “The railroad and the telegraph, more than any 
previous factors, underscored the time-related values of punctuality and speed and nudged those 
values higher in the 19th-century American consciousness.”  Stephens, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
 266. “The age had its doubts and hesitations, but it was essentially characterized by hubris that 
ignored the warning messages and pushed the throttle full speed ahead.”  KERN, supra note 22, at 
108. 
 267. ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 at 42-43 (1967).  See also 
Kenneth Cmiel, Destiny and Amnesia: The Vision of Modernity in Robert Wiebe’s THE SEARCH FOR 
ORDER, 21 REV. IN AM. HIST. 352 (1993) (characterizing Wiebe’s book as “a much sadder book 
than is normally thought, one that paints a rather grim, even bleak, picture of life in the twentieth 
century.”)  Id. 
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known and hierarchies understood.268  But that “nation of loosely 
connected islands”269 changed as railroads and businesses expanded.  
Big business, ultimately requiring regulation,270 came into its own.271 
The 1870s were dominated by a six year economic depression, 
triggered by the railroads no longer attracting long term investments.272  
Economic depressions were something people tended to view as a moral 
judgment.273  The exhilaration, or at least relief, that had come with the 
end of the Civil War had changed during Reconstruction.  “Out of this 
process [Reconstruction] had come a haunting sense of the war’s failure, 
a vague feeling of political betrayal.”274 
As Robert Wiebe suggests in his book, The Search for Order, 1877-
1920, average Americans continued to try to solve problems with a pre-
Civil War mentality, not recognizing that the world had drastically 
changed.275  One of many examples of this was railroad management. 
[D]espite a past strewn with disappointment, railroad executives 
continued to lay track they did not want to build, engage in rate wars 
they had wished to avoid, and count on a perpetual prosperity that 
                                                                                                                                 
 268. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 2. 
 269. Id. at 4. 
 270. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (Feb. 4, 1887) (current version at 49 
U.S.C. §§ 1-22, 25-27, 153, 301-302, 314-327, 901-923, 1001-1022), and Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (July 2, 1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7).  
Then in 1887 Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, an evasive measure that 
ostensibly outlawed pooling and a number of discriminatory practices.  Because the law 
did not seriously restrict railroads, some executives actually welcomed it as a protective 
cover.  Nevertheless, the mere passage of such an act through a Congress of the late 
nineteenth century indicated the breadth of antagonism toward the iron autocrats. 
WIEBE, supra note 267, at 53-54.  See also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 233-34 
(1955).  “From the very beginning, at any rate, when the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed in 
1890, it was recognized by most of the astute politicians of that hour as a gesture, a ceremonial 
concession to an overwhelming public demand for some kind of reassuring action against the 
trusts.” Id. at 245.  See also EISENACH, supra note 41, at 156-61, (discussing the ineffectiveness of 
these two laws). 
 271. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 40.  Wiebe describes a “segmented morality:” piety on Sunday 
and then animal cunning in the business world during the week.  Id.  In response to industrial 
growth, Americans, “in a time of confusion . . . responded with a quantitative ethic that became the 
hallmark of their crisis in values.  It seemed that the age could only be comprehended in bulk.  Men 
defined issues by how much, how many, how far. . . .  [T]he cult of the millionaires arrived.”  Id. 
 272. Id. at 1. 
 273. Id. at 2.  “In a nation geared to promotion and expansion, stagnant years had traditionally 
carried a special frustration.  They were literally soul-searching times, for throughout the nineteenth 
century a great many looked upon economic downturns as a moral judgment, precise punishment 
for the country’s sins.”  Id.  There would be another, far worse depression in the international 
economy in the early 1890s.  See AYERS, supra note 259, at 283. 
 274. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 5. 
 275. WIEBE, supra note 267. 
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would never come.  What seemed to them a series of rational responses 
added up to an utterly irrational industrial policy that courted danger 
for large portions of a dependent economy.276 
The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 exemplified the strangeness of the 
time.277  In July 1877, the management of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad announced another in a series of wage cuts that set off a wildcat 
strike that spread across the country.278  “In the towns, people expressed 
a rather orderly hostility to the roads.  But in the cities crowds gathered 
and milled, clashed with trigger-happy vigilantes and militia, then 
drifted downtown to riot and loot.”279  Federal troops were called out, 
the rioting put down, and then the event was quickly dismissed as “no 
more than a bad memory”280 as Americans resumed their relentless pace, 
“building, growing, expanding.”281 
In the 1880s the railroads continued to expand, but now like the rest 
of the business world, had to contend with the growth of unions.282  
“[M]embership in the Knights of Labor [swelled] from 50,000 in 1884 to 
more than 700,000 in 1886.”283  The sons and grandsons of Irish and 
German immigrants were assuming their place in the American world of 
work and they were not so malleable: “A docile generation was giving 
way to a demanding one.”284 
By 1891, 40 percent of railroads were in receivership, obviously 
posing a huge problem for the American economy.285  J.P. Morgan, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 276. Id. at 19. 
What was true of business in general applied as well to banking. . . .  With intuitive 
methods for gauging the business cycle and rule-of-thumb measures for evaluating credit 
risks, [bankers] relied on stabs of shrewdness, not long-range wisdom, in conducting 
their affairs.  Bankers at all levels strained to comprehend an increasingly complex, 
impersonal operation. 
Id. at 21.  “In fact, at one time or another in the decade following the war, portions of every sector 
of the American population felt defrauded by bankers.”  LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST 
MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA 13 (1978).  For a particularly 
lucid description of the currency problems during the Civil War and the use of the gold and silver 
standard versus the use of paper money (greenbacks because of the green ink).  See id. at 10-12. 
 277. This account is taken from WIEBE, supra note 267, at 10. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 44-45: There were “two bursts of railroad construction, one 
following 1879 and the other 1885, which together produced more trackage than any comparable 
period in American history.”  Id. at 47. 
 283. Id. at 44-45. 
 284. Id. at 50. 
 285. Id. at 26.  See also EISENACH, supra note 41, at 158: 
Even with the gold standard to guarantee steady flows of foreign investment and the 
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financier,286 provided an elegant and simple solution. 
By and large the receiverships did not reflect economic disaster.  In an 
effort to entice investors during the prosperous years, many railroads 
had financed their expansion through bonds with payments enforceable 
at law, and now sudden hard times led them to pass a dividend. . . .  
[T]hey entered a technical bankruptcy . . . [and] reorganized the 
corporations by paring the bonded debt and weighting their finances 
with common stock.  For the first time in a depression capitalists had 
appreciable money to invest. . . .  The economy’s surplus had brought 
power—and very handsome fees—to a small pocket of investment 
bankers, whose reorientation of a fundamental industry pointed toward 
broad changes in the structure of business.287 
While the focus has been on the railroads as an example of the 
changes sweeping America in the post-Reconstruction era of the 1870s-
80s, the same unrest, uneasiness and searching for a redefinition took 
place in other industries, in town and country, within established 
communities and immigrant enclaves. 
The agrarian myth had taken hold in America by the early 
nineteenth century.288  But after the Civil War, farmers’ children left 
their family farms in increasing numbers to seize the opportunities and 
embrace the excitement of the newly emerging cities, prompting laments 
from traditionalists.  “In the imagery of these appeals the earth was 
characteristically a mother, trade a harlot, and desertion of ancestral 
ways a betrayal that invited Providential punishment.”289  Despite the 
agrarian myth which gripped the American imagination well into the 
                                                                                                                                 
establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 to override state 
beggar-thy-neighbor competition for low rates, such were the statutory ambiguity and 
the multiple demands placed on the Commission by regional competition for low rates 
that railroad bankruptcy was the norm.  And, until the ICC was given substantial new 
authority in 1906 and 1910, it fell to masters appointed by federal bankruptcy judges to 
restructure by fiat entire regional and national systems of rail transportation. 
Id. at 158 (footnotes omitted).  See SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 248-284, for an account of the 
reconstituted Interstate Commerce Commission and its regulation of the railroads after World War 
I. 
 286. MARTIN GILBERT, 1 A HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 43 (1997).  Of J.P. 
Morgan, “[t]he British philosopher Bertrand Russell . . . wrote: ‘Edward VII, the Kaiser, and the 
Pope, entertained him as if he were a visiting monarch’ . . . .  [T]he answer to ‘Who made the 
world?’ was ‘God made the world in 4004 BC, but it was reorganized by James H. Hull, J. Pierpont 
Morgan and John D. Rockefeller.’”  Id. 
 287. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 26. 
 288. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 23-36 (examining the “Yeoman and the Myth”). 
 289. Id. at 33. “Here was the irony from which the farmer suffered above all others: the United 
States was the only country in the world that began with perfection and aspired to progress.”  Id. at 
35-36. 
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twentieth century, the reality of farm life, especially post-Civil War was 
far from benevolent.290  The crop lien system, especially prevalent in the 
South, was a particularly pernicious form of servitude.291  The proceeds 
from a farmer’s crops were never quite enough to cover what he owed 
the furnishing merchant who loaned the farmer enough money at 
usurious interest rates to put in his crop each year and otherwise barely 
subsist.  The deep humiliation suffered by these farmers over decades 
eventually fueled the Populist movement.292 
From 1870 to 1910, the population of the United States increased 
two and one-third times, and most of that growth took place in urban 
environments among the new middle class.293  Cities grew rapidly in the 
United States between 1860 and 1910.294  They filled with rural people 
and immigrants and being so new, they were not effectively managed.295  
The cost of living in the United States rose 35 percent between 1897 and 
1913; this was particularly problematic for laborers with stagnant wages 
and only fed the growth of labor unions.296  This was the dawn of 
muckraking journalism: “It was muckraking that brought the diffuse 
malaise of the public into focus.”297 
The general restlessness led to reform movements in the 1890s, 
notably the Populist movement298 and, after the turn of the century, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 290. Id. 
 291. See GOODWYN, supra note 276, at 20-25.  See also, AYERS, supra note 259, chs. 8 and 9 
(describing the life of Southern farmers and the political alliances that eventually grew up in 
response to the evils of the crop lien system).  For a different perspective on the problem, see 
EISENACH, supra note 41, at 181. 
The curse of the post-Civil War South was its gradual reenslavement of the freedmen 
and poor whites in the grinding poverty of agricultural tenancy and subsistence farming.  
Every decade after the war ended, the number of farms in the southern states increased, 
and every decade per capita income fell relative to the national average.  In contrast, 
agriculture in both the “old” and the “new” Midwest was thriving in partnership with the 
new corporations.  Farms were declining in numbers and rapidly and systematically 
increasing their productivity.  From the 1870s onward, both materially and morally, they 
were becoming an integral part of the new industrial economy. 
Id. 
 292. GOODWYN, supra note 276, at 26.  “How to cope with the lien system?  Some of the 
farmers decided politics was the answer and they tried to lead the order into the Greenback Party.”  
Id. 
 293. HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 217-18. 
 294. Id. at 174. 
 295. Id. at 175. 
 296. Id. at 168-69. 
 297. Id. at 187. “Corruption thus became a particularly fine issue for the moral energies of the 
Progressive.  He was ready to be convinced that the country was thoroughly wicked, and the 
muckrakers supplied him with a wealth of plausible evidence.”  Id. at 212. 
 298. Richard Hofstadter defines Populism as more than just the Populist party of the 1890s; it 
was a “popular impulse that is endemic in American political culture. . . . that expressed the 
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Progressive movement.299  “Populism appeared to gain strength with 
each election. . . .  [T]he party won almost 10 percent of the Presidential 
vote in 1892; . . . two years later its total vote rose by nearly 50 percent, 
and for the first time it captured a Southern state.”300  Populism, a rural 
phenomenon, tended to be popular with the “little guy,” the one who felt 
cheated by the growing successes of the industrial barons.301  Again 
Wiebe is instructive in his description of the 1890s.302 
Anxiety, like the common cold, was a most egalitarian malady which 
in many respects ran the same course wherever it struck.  Men in 
formal authority, equally disturbed by their sprawling, impersonal 
society, also reached out for that essential, elusive mastery.  Like the 
protectors of the community, they underwent a basic shift in outlook 
which converted incidents into series, giving their worries that same 
cumulative, self-fueling quality. . . . 
In the baldest sense, they came to fear that the people might rule.  
Individualism, except as a mode of implicit contempt for the scattered 
                                                                                                                                 
discontents of a great many farmers and businessmen with the economic changes of the late 
nineteenth century.”  HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 4-5. 
 299. HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 4.  Progressivism, as defined by Richard Hofstadter, is 
not just the Progressive Party, but: 
[T]hat broader impulse toward criticism and change that was everywhere so conspicuous 
after 1900, when the already forceful stream of agrarian discontent was enlarged and 
redirected by the growing enthusiasm of middle-class people for social and economic 
reform. . . .  Its general theme was the effort to restore a type of economic individualism 
and political democracy that was widely believed to have existed earlier in America and 
to have been destroyed by the great corporation and the corrupt political machine; and 
with that restoration to bring back a kind of morality and civic purity that was also 
believed to have been lost. 
Id. at 5-6.  But see Rodgers, supra note 39, at 114 (outlining numerous attempts by historians to 
define progressivism). “Only by discarding the mistaken assumption of a coherent reform 
movement could one see the progressives’ world for what it really was: an era of shifting, 
ideologically fluid, issue-focused coalitions, all competing for the reshaping of American society.”  
Id. at 114.  See also KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22, at 10.  “As political theories and political 
movements, the American and European varieties of social democracy and progressivism were too 
multifaceted and dynamic to be contained neatly within generalizations drawn from twenty or even 
several hundred individuals.”  Kloppenberg does however take a stab at defining progressivism.  
KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22.  He notes that there were at least four different strains: 1) the 
political reformers who wanted to streamline government; 2) the antimonopolists; 3) the nativists 
and prohibitionists; and 4) those with “social consciousness” who felt the individual had a “social 
duty” and that government existed for the “common good.”  Id. at 311.  The reformist impulses of 
these four groups were often at odds.  Id. at 300.  Kloppenberg also emphasizes the graduated or 
progressive income tax as the “central doctrine of progressivism,” and “the quintessential 
progressive reform”.  Id. at 300, 355. 
 300. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 90. 
 301. Id. at 85. 
 302. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 76-77. 
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sheep below, almost always referred to the rights of an elite to retain 
what they held and to acquire more; cohesion meant an imposed order, 
one that would necessitate a sharp-edged enforcement.303 
The Pullman strike of 1894 in which Chicago railroad workers, members 
of the American Railway Union under Eugene Debs, paralyzed the hub 
of the nation’s railroads, was effectively put down by the newly formed 
coalition of “men in formal authority.”304  “The basic new machinery-an 
employers’ association, an alert national executive, strategically placed 
troops, and an amenable judiciary—had combined to crack the boycott 
and smash the union.”305 
The Republican candidate, William McKinley, won the presidential 
election of 1896, signalling the death of Populism and momentarily 
stalling the reform movement impulse.306  From 1895-1905, a new 
middle class arose, dividing itself among professionals, businessmen, 
and big farmers.  Neither the poor lower class nor the rich upper class 
was particularly sympathetic to this new middle class.307  “Members of 
the new class announced their bold visions too loudly and exposed too 
often the shadows on their own bright faith.”308  It was the vigorous 
middle class that would usher in the Progressive movement in the first 
decade of the twentieth century.309 
Several points in this more general history of the period strike a 
chord in the history of time.  One concern is the developing view of the 
human personality.  “Despite some borrowing from recent European 
philosophy, faculty psychology as Americans employed it was rooted 
fundamentally in this Christian tradition of God and the Devil struggling 
for man’s soul.”310  This echoes the conflict over sun time (God’s time) 
versus man-made clock time. 
This was the era of American behaviorism, scientific management, 
pragmatism, the scientific method, bureaucracy, and the social gospel.311  
                                                                                                                                 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 76, 91. 
 305. Id. at 92. 
 306. Id. at 104-05.  “Throughout America a residual fear had shrunk the outer limits of 
optimism.”  Id. at 110. 
 307. Id. at 130. 
 308. Id. at 132.  “They had enough insight into their lives to recognize that the old ways and 
old values would no longer suffice.  Often confused, they were still the ones with the determination 
to fight those confusions and mark a new route into the modern world.”  Id. 
 309. Id. at 208.  “Progressivism reached floodtide around 1912.”  Id. 
 310. Id. at 148. 
 311. Id. at ch. 7 (“Progressivism Arrives”). 
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With the development of these ideas came a new urban progressivism.312  
Utility regulation increased; taxes were assessed; the secret ballot as well 
as child and female protective legislation was enacted.313  Women began 
to exercise political influence.314  Smooth administration in corporations 
and in government, “a frictionless bureaucracy,”315 became the 
aspiration.316  The world became modern and part of this modernity was 
the inevitable need to have one, agreed-upon, easily understood mode 
for telling time.317 
As the century turned, change was the watchword.   
Close to the center of each theory of change lay the problem of 
society’s cohesion.  What held it together as it moved?  The original 
classical theory answered that cohesion came as a by-product of the 
natural laws.  Entrepreneurial genius, self-interest, and habit combined 
to integrate any society that was abiding by fundamental principles.  
Yet in the face of actual conflict, its advocates could only threaten 
greater wreckage as an incentive to unite.  Nothing guaranteed 
cohesion.  A society could always commit suicide, it seemed, if its 
members chose.318 
And if ever one needed an example of such breakdown of cohesion, 
such societal suicide, one need not look farther than World War I,319 for 
                                                                                                                                 
 312. Id.  
 313. For comprehensive histories of the legislative and administrative changes that took place 
in American society during the Progressive era, see MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW 
ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990) and MORTON 
KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-
1933 (1994).  See SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 248-84 for his description of the ascendancy of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission and its regulation of the railroads in the Progressive era. 
 314. EISENACH, supra note 41, at 9: 
But whether possessed of the vote or not, beginning in the 1890s, politically active 
women and their male allies became leaders, publicists, and sponsors of an avalanche of 
local, state, and national legislation regarding child and female labor, compulsory school 
attendance, the age of female consent for sex and for marriage, food safety, housing 
conditions, and prostitution. 
Id. 
 315. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 161. 
 316. Id. at 170.  “Scientific government, the urban reformers believed, would bring 
opportunity, progress, order, and community.”  Id.  In corporations there were more administrative 
centralization and reliance on experts.  Id. at 181. 
 317. Id. at 295.  “As if to remind citizens of the modern day while they hurried about their 
affairs, Congress imposed standard time zones across the land.”  Id. 
 318. Id. at 155. 
 319. “War created abnormalities in abundance.  Sharp inflation, a new vocabulary, and a welter 
of government agencies each expressed part of a strangeness that filtered rapidly through American 
society in 1917. . . .  The most powerful influence was a generalized sense of national crisis, one 
which millions predicated but could not define.”  WIEBE, supra note 267, at 286.  “World War I 
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Americans the most disillusioning, cataclysmic disruption of life since 
the Civil War.320  And for Europeans World War I was worse because it 
was fought on their home territory.  As Stephen Kern describes it in his 
book, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918, the time perception of 
the average person changed radically with the War.321  “So, in the larger 
world, the impact of the automobile and of all the accelerating 
technology was at least twofold—it speeded up the tempo of current 
existence and transformed the memory of years past, the stuff of 
everybody’s identity, into something slow.”322 
The increased pace of daily life was not the only dramatic change.  
The very class system and the black and white mind-set of the Victorians 
was gone forever.323  In fact, the change had begun even earlier.  “In 
sociological terms, the class system was changing, and the mighty 
railroad was the cause.”324 
It is against this picture of the late nineteenth/early twentieth 
centuries, that one must consider the court cases previously analyzed.  
While there were specific principles of law that could explain away each 
of those cases, those principles tend to trivialize the opinions.  I suggest 
that these disputes reached the states’ highest courts because a larger 
issue was involved: the determination of time.  No longer a private 
matter of individual autonomy, time’s reckoning was receiving 
inconsistent treatment by the courts who were struggling with this 
dilemma.  Now it was up to the national legislature to take over. 
                                                                                                                                 
was the apotheosis of the prewar sense of speed.”  KERN, supra note 22, at 299. 
 320. “The great war and its aftershocks shattered the politics of progressivism on both sides of 
the Atlantic.”  KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22, at 370.  There is, however, no one, true, and 
indisputable interpretation of any event in the Progressive era.  Not everyone was devastated by the 
war.  “Indeed, for those more cosmopolitan Progressives in charge, the shortness of the war 
occasioned regret. . . .  [T]o many Progressive intellectuals the war was proof that America and 
Americans were capable of higher national service and selfless national citizenship.”  EISENACH, 
supra note 41, at 247.  If the war had only continued longer, more such selflessness could have been 
shown. 
 321. See, e.g., KERN, supra note 22, ch. 11, The Cubist War, at 288-312.  Kern is not the only 
one who has noted the change of time discipline and perception.  “An obsession before the war, 
efficiency acquired near-religious status once the war began.”  O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 271. 
 322. KERN, supra note 22, at 129.  This idea has been echoed by James Gleick: “We fool 
ourselves with false nostalgia—a nostalgia for what never was.  Whenever we speed up the present, 
as a curious side effect we slow down the past.”  GLEICK, supra note 46, at 277.  Clark Blaise offers 
a similar analysis: “We want more speed but we resent, or at least lament, the elimination of the 
slower and, arguably, finer, more graceful experiences they replace.”  BLAISE, supra note 16, at 
145. 
 323. KERN, supra note 22, at 301.  “World War I assaulted far more of the hierarchical 
structures of privilege than its participants had ever expected.”  Id.   
 324. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 142-43, discussing CHARLES DICKENS, DOMBEY AND SON 
(1848). 
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VI.  CONGRESS FINALLY ACTS 
The American chapter of the story of “legal” time reached a 
watershed when the United States Congress, on March 19, 1918, enacted 
legislation establishing both standard time and daylight saving time.325  
A year later, daylight saving time was repealed,326 starting a cycle of 
enactment and repeal that would continue throughout the twentieth 
century.327 
Standard time was established by dividing the continental United 
States into five time zones at the 75th, 90th, 105th, 120th, and 150th 
(including only Alaska) degrees of longitude west of Greenwich.328  The 
limits of each zone were to be defined by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission “having regard for the convenience of commerce. . . .”329  
Hereafter the standard times would be called Eastern, Central, Mountain, 
Pacific, and Alaska. 
Daylight saving time was to start on the last Sunday of March each 
year by advancing the standard time within each zone one hour and this 
condition was to last until the last Sunday of October when the clocks 
would be turned back one hour.330 
The motivation for passage of this act mainly focused on the 
daylight saving part, even though it would be repealed a year later.  
Daylight saving time had been tried in Europe during World War I and 
was considered successful for fuel conservation and national efficiency.  
“The return in gardening, the fuel saving, and the general health 
improvement—those are the three main arguments”331 advanced for 
daylight saving time.  Gardening produced more food in wartime.  The 
extra hour of light benefited health by making possible more outdoor 
recreation and benefited food production by making gardening possible 
in the evenings.  Regarding fuel savings, 
The various electric lighting companies of England . . . showed an 
average reduction of 23 percent in amount of light consumed.   
                                                                                                                                 
 325. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918). 
 326. See 41 Stat. 280 (1919). 
 327. See STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 17th unnumbered page (giving a brief history of daylight 
saving time in the United States).  See also HEIDI G. YACKER, DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME, CRS REP. 
TO CONG. No. 98-99C (1998). 
 328. 40 Stat. 450-51, § 1 (1918). 
 329. 40 Stat. 450-51, § 1 (1918). 
 330. 40 Stat. 450-51, § 3 (1918). 
 331. A Bill to Save Daylight and to Provide Standard Time for the United States: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, S. 1854, 65th Cong. 5 (1917) 
(testimony of Mr. Matthew M. Marks of New York City, President of the National Daylight Saving 
Association). 
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The estimated saving in gas amounted to about 9 percent.   
The estimated saving in coal consumption throughout the United 
Kingdom is 260,000 tons.  There was also a considerable saving in the 
quantity of illuminating oil.332 
In the United States, “[t]his conservation and this economy, in view of 
the fact that upward of $350,000,000 worth of coal, oil, and gas are 
wasted annually, should commend themselves to those who believe in 
the elimination of unnecessary waste.”333 
It all sounded so good, so patriotic.  Yet daylight saving time was 
repealed a year later.334  The standard time for each zone had been set at 
the center of each zone, and so there was at least a half hour discrepancy 
at the eastern and western boundaries of each zone from mean or solar 
time.  When daylight saving time went into effect, this discrepancy 
increased to an hour and a half at the western edge of each zone.335  “It is 
this wide and unnatural discrepancy which has given rise to much of the 
opposition to daylight saving.”336 
There was “almost universal complaint from the coal miners, truck 
gardeners, and farmers in eastern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.”337  From 
the coal miner’s standpoint: 
He finishes his work while the sun is still high and returns home, but 
must go to bed while it is still light in order that he may secure 
sufficient sleep for his next day’s work.  For men engaged in such 
dangerous and arduous work as coal mining Congress should legislate 
to lighten their burdens, and their comfort and necessities should more 
strongly appeal to us than the pleasure and convenience of others.338 
For the farmers, daylight saving time, “disturb[ed] nature’s plan for 
both man and beast.”339  It affected milk processing and there was a 
problem with the dew on the ground in the morning which had to be 
burned off by the sun before farm laborers could go to work.340  There 
was thus a loss of two morning hours with daylight saving time instead 
                                                                                                                                 
 332. Id. at 6. 
 333. Id. at  23.  (Daylight Saving: Report of R.L. Brunet to lighting committee of city council 
of Providence, R.I., March, 1917). 
 334. 41 Stat. 280 (1919). 
 335. H.R. REP. NO. 3854, at 1-2 (1919). 
 336. Id. at 2. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 3. 
 340. Id. 
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of one hour under solar time.341  It was darkly warned that all this would 
“inevitably result in an increase in the cost of food.”342 
As to all this, proponents of daylight saving urge that the farmers ought 
to be willing to adjust themselves to the new conditions 
notwithstanding the inconvenience and loss such conditions may 
entail.  The farmer with greater reason might ask that the dwellers in 
cities should do this adjusting; that as his labor produces the food for 
both urban and rural populations and during this war for the armies and 
people of Europe, he is entitled, now that the war is over, to enjoy the 
normal conditions which existed since the birth of the Republic.343 
In the same report, yet another problem was cited: “‘sitting up late’ is 
becoming a habit with thousands of children as well as of grown-ups,”344 
and this was resulting in “the growing irritability of children and to a 
reduced efficiency in school work. . . .”345  To the twenty-first century 
mind, this borders on paternalism, but, in fact, a bill to repeal the 
daylight saving provision was passed by Congress on August 20, 
1919.346  It was then vetoed by President Wilson and subsequently 
passed over the veto.347  National daylight saving time ended on the last 
Sunday in October 1919.348 
But, in fact, it did not end.  Rather, it was the beginning of a tug of 
war that would continue for most of the twentieth century with passage 
and repeal of local ordinances, state legislation, and finally additional 
federal daylight saving time law.349  But that saga deserves its own 
                                                                                                                                 
 341. Id.  
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 2-3. 
 344. Id. at  4. 
 345. Id. 
 346. 41 Stat. 280 (1919). 
 347. STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 19th unnumbered page. 
 348. 41 Stat. 280 (1919).  See also U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, STANDARD TIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF STANDARD AND DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND AN ANALYSIS OF RELATED LAWS 4 (1970). 
 349. The major post-World War I, twentieth century daylight saving time laws in the United 
States include: Amendment to the Federal Standard Time Act, 41 Stat. 1446 (March 4, 1921) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 265); War Time Act, 56 Stat. 9 (January 20, 1942) (current version 
at 15 U.S.C. § 261); Amendment to the War Time Act, 59 Stat. 537 (September 25, 1945) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. § 261); District of Columbia Daylight Saving Time Act, 63 Stat. 29 (March 31, 
1949) (repealed in 1949); An Act to Promote the Observance of a Uniform System of Time 
Throughout the United States, 80 Stat. 107 (April 13, 1966) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 260, 
260a); The Uniform Time Act Amendment, 86 Stat. 116 (March 30, 1972) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 260a); Emergency Daylight Saving Time Energy Conservation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 707 
(December 15, 1973) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 260a); Emergency Daylight Saving Time 
Energy Conservation Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1209 (October 5, 1974) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 
45
Parrish: Litigating Time in America
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
PARRISH1.DOC 1/6/03  2:16 PM 
46 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
separate telling. 
In terms of the Legal Process Theory described earlier, the 1918 act 
was the culmination of the legal process, with a federal agency taking 
over the regulation of time determination in the United States.  In terms 
of the history of Progressivism, and time’s small role in that complex, if 
not impenetrable, history, social cohesion demanded that everyone living 
their lockstep lives in the increasingly urbanized America of the early 
twentieth century must tell time the same way.  After a period of relative 
weakness for the legislative branch where the judiciary tended to step in 
and take charge of such matters, or at least tried to do so, Congress came 
into its own during World War I and passed the legislation mandating 
the use of standard time.  Legal and historical interpetations aside, 
emotion, psychology, and personal philosophy have continued to play a 
large part in the way people think about time and its determination, even 
into the twenty-first century. 
Michael O’Malley has offered some thoughts on the dynamics of 
the dispute.  “Some farmers experienced genuine economic hardship as a 
result of daylight saving, and many more suffered serious 
inconvenience.  But others resented having the arbitrary strictures of 
machine time imposed on their lives.”350  There was a genuine rural 
versus urban, working class versus leisure class conflict operating, and it 
focused on the game of golf: “As a thoroughly non-productive, silly 
game played on the coiffed and manicured surface of perfectly good 
land, golf symbolized the utter decadence that underlay the daylight 
saving movement.  The enemies of daylight saving scorned golf, again 
and again, as the wasteful indulgence of a parasitical class.”351 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Knowing the correct time is as important to the well-being of 
modern people as any prerogative outlined in the Bill of Rights.  If one 
cannot determine the time with certainty, one cannot be a part of the 
modern world.  The truth of these statements is underscored by the fact 
                                                                                                                                 
260a); Fire Prevention and Control Authorizations Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 764 (July 8, 1986) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 260a, 2216f); Establishment of a Standard Time Zone for Guam 
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 2811 (December 23, 
2000) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261, 263, 267). 
 350. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 281. 
 351. Id. at 285.  Golf was still an issue in 2001!  Morton Marcus, an Indiana University 
economist, discussing the resistance to daylight saving in Indiana “said he thought the daylight 
saving time push was ‘largely driven by the desire to play golf at night.’”  See Belluck, supra note 
48, at A1. 
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that everyone takes time determination for granted.  At least it is taken 
for granted until someone in authority talks about changing it. 
It is axiomatic that we live by the law because it is more peaceful, 
predictable and productive than living in a lawless state would be.  
Determining the time is one of those societal rules that can be lawfully 
regulated and should be reasonably acceptable to all citizens.  Yet if this 
article has shown anything, it has shown that establishing a standard 
time adhered to by all turned out to be both an enormously complex 
process and one that is still evolving. 
Time does not simply regulate our activities.  The awareness of 
time has gotten inside our minds and our souls and is a part of our very 
self-identification.  That makes it far less susceptible to standardized 
definition.  Looking at the sun in a previous era reminded us of our 
puniness and the triviality of our concerns.  The sun was “up there” 
where God is believed to reside.  So, telling the time by the sun was 
necessarily a religious experience, certainly a deeply personal one.  
Looking at a clock on the wall, or the watch on one’s wrist, or the digital 
readout in the lower corner of one’s computer screen just does not 
compare.  No longer a private matter, time determination has officially 
become public law-bound and regulated.  Unofficially, time 
determination remains mysterious and elusive. 
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